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Abstract
The growing population in cities creates huge demand for urban last-mile delivery. Booming
e-commerce activities further increase this demand, exerting intense pressure on the cities’
well-being. To build a city with congestion and pollution under control, a consolidator
can operate an urban consolidation center (UCC) to bundle shipments from multiple carri-
ers before the last-mile delivery. Alternatively, the consolidator can operate a peer-to-peer
platform for the carriers to share their delivery capacity. Our objective is to compare the
performance of these two business models. Under each business model, we study the in-
teractions between a consolidator and multiple carriers using a two-period game-theoretical
model. In each period, the consolidator first chooses a delivery fee to maximize her expected
profit. Each carrier then observes his task volume, and decides whether to deliver on his own
or use the consolidator’s service to minimize his expected cost. Under the UCC model, the
carriers become more dependent on the UCC to deliver their tasks as their variable delivery
cost increases or their logistics reestablishment cost decreases. Under the platform model,
the carriers generally keep their logistics capability (even if they purchase capacity from the
platform) in equilibrium to ensure their flexibility of selling capacity on the platform. Be-
tween the two business models, it is generally more profitable for the consolidator to operate
the UCC than the platform if the carriers’ fixed delivery cost is large. Furthermore, the
UCC becomes more dominant as there are more carriers. If the number of carriers is large,
it is also more efficient for the consolidator to operate the UCC than the platform to reduce
the expected social-environmental cost. Otherwise, the platform is more efficient.
Keywords: last-mile delivery, collaborative logistics, urban consolidation center, peer-to-
peer platform, game theory
1 Introduction
Last-mile delivery is the last leg of a supply chain that transfers freight or packages from
a distribution center to a receiver. It comprises up to 28% of the total delivery cost of a
supply chain (Lopez, 2017, Wang et al., 2016). Managing last-mile delivery becomes especially
challenging if it is performed in an urban area, where congestion increases fuel consumption,
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causes delay of delivery, and lowers delivery efficiency (Ranieri et al., 2018). In addition, last-
mile delivery is the most expensive and critical operation for companies engaged in e-commerce
(Lee and Whang, 2001). Due to the continuous growth of urban population and e-commerce
activities, last-mile delivery to a city center exerts intense pressure on the city’s economic, social,
and environmental well-being (Quak and Tavasszy, 2011).
The economic impact of urban last-mile delivery includes the waste of resources due to extra
waiting in traffic congestion and low utilization of uncoordinated vehicles transporting freight
to the city center. The large number of small, individual customer orders in e-commerce further
complicates urban last-mile delivery and incurs significant costs. The social-environmental
impact includes the vicious effect of the increasing traffic incidents and pollution due to transport
vehicles, which degrades the quality of life in the city. For example, based on the Beijing
Municipal Environmental Monitoring Center’s statistics, emissions of transport vehicles are the
main source of PM2.5 that causes hazardous haze in Beijing (http://www.bjmemc.com.cn/).
To build a smart city with congestion and pollution under control, an urban consolidation
center (UCC) is a potential solution to mitigate the repercussion of urban last-mile delivery.
Also known as a city distribution center (van Duin et al., 2008) or an urban distribution center
(Boudoin et al., 2014), a UCC consolidates shipments from multiple carriers and then deliv-
ers them to the city center using the UCC’s own fleet of trucks. A consolidator operating a
UCC usually requires a facility to sort the shipments according to their destinations before they
are delivered. As a result of the consolidation with fewer trucks, higher truck utilization can
be achieved, leading to a lower delivery cost. This shipment consolidation not only economi-
cally benefits stakeholders, including the consolidator, the carriers, and the public authorities
(Ambrosini and Routhier, 2004), but also mitigates the social-environmental impact because of
reduced traffic. Ideally, the resultant cost savings can be shared among the carriers, motivating
them to use the UCC’s service.
Despite the potential benefits, many UCC projects in practice are not successful. The UCCs
of the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey were closed after five years of operations
(Doig, 2001). Dablanc (2011) reports that 150 UCC projects were started in Europe during the
last 25 years, but only five projects survive. Even if they survive, they usually have difficulty to
break even and require significant subsidies from the government. For example, it costs a UCC
in La Rochelle 3.8e to deliver a parcel to a customer who is charged only 1.7–3e. A UCC in
Monaco charges her customers 2.30e/100Kg, and receives 2.59e/100Kg as a subsidy from the
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local government (Dablanc, 2005). Many UCC projects failed because the carriers were reluctant
to use their service. This is supported by a survey in the NYC metro, which reveals that less
than 20% of the carriers would like to participate in a UCC project (Holguin-Veras et al., 2008).
Their reluctance to participate is mainly due to a common concern that they may over rely on
the UCCs. Many carriers reduce their own logistics capacity after using a consolidation service
(Snapp, 2012, Vivaldini et al., 2012, Choe et al., 2017). For example, the logistics department of
GOME, a Chinese retailer for electrical appliances, reduces its investment in delivery trucks and
drivers after engaging a consolidation service (National Express, 2010). The substantial cost
of reestablishing the logistics capability, which includes the costs to purchase trucks, recruit
drivers, obtain licenses, and gain knowledge about local clients (Browne et al., 2005), makes the
carriers reluctant to rely on a UCC’s service.
More recently, some peer-to-peer platforms have been established for carriers to share their
delivery capacity. Notable examples include Saloodo! by DHL, Freightos and Convoy in Europe,
Loadsmart in U.S., and Cainiao and Truck Alliance in China. On such a platform, a carrier can
sell his unused capacity to another carrier to fulfill the latter’s delivery needs. It is attractive for
a consolidator to operate a platform because it requires neither a sorting facility nor a fleet of
delivery trucks. The peer-to-peer platform business model typically follows a sharing-economy
approach: The platform takes a revenue share from each transaction of capacity for providing
market access to the carriers and for processing the transaction (Gesing, 2017). In contrast to
the UCCs’ low success rate, the emergence of the capacity sharing platforms motivates us to
investigate whether the latter can be a better alternative for a city to address the challenges of
urban last-mile delivery.
Although bearing the delivery costs, a UCC can achieve a larger economy of scale as each
truck of the UCC may consolidate the tasks of many carriers. In contrast, a capacity sharing
platform does not incur any delivery cost, but each individual carrier on the platform has only
very limited delivery capacity compared to the UCC’s fleet. In this paper, we compare the
above two business models for urban last-mile delivery in terms of the consolidator’s profit
and the social-environmental cost. Specifically, the consolidator can either operate a UCC to
bundle shipments from multiple carriers before the last-mile delivery, or operate a peer-to-peer
platform for the carriers to share their delivery capacity. For each business model, we develop a
two-period game-theoretical model to capture the interactions between the consolidator and the
carriers. In each period, knowing that each carrier has a delivery task with a random volume
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to fulfill, the consolidator first determines the delivery fee to maximize her expected profit.
Then, after knowing his task volume, each carrier decides whether to deliver his task to the city
center on his own or use the consolidator’s service such that his expected cost is minimized. By
identifying subgame perfect Nash Equilibrium with rational expectations, we have obtained the
following insights.
(i) If the consolidator operates a UCC, we observe the trade-off faced by the carriers in
practice: The carriers can potentially save their delivery costs by using the UCC’s service,
while they face the risk of eliminating their logistics capability. As their variable delivery cost
increases, the carriers become more dependent on the UCC to deliver their tasks to the city
center. On the other hand, as the cost to reestablish their logistics capability increases, the
carriers become less dependent on the UCC.
(ii) If the consolidator operates a capacity sharing platform, we find that the carriers gen-
erally have their logistics capability on hand (even if they purchase capacity from the platform)
in equilibrium. This ensures sufficient capacity available on the platform to facilitate successful
transactions. Since the platform can always earn a positive profit from each successful transac-
tion, it can be more financially sustainable in the long run. Our results explain the increasing
popularity of the capacity sharing platforms in practice.
(iii) Comparing the UCC and the platform in terms of the consolidator’s expected profit, we
find that it is generally more profitable for the consolidator to operate the UCC than the platform
if the carriers’ fixed delivery cost is large. Moreover, it is easier for the UCC to dominate as
the number of carriers becomes larger. In terms of reducing the expected social-environmental
cost, our comparison between the UCC and the platform shows that if the number of carriers
is large, then it is more efficient for the consolidator to operate the UCC than the platform.
Furthermore, the condition for the UCC to outperform the platform varies with the distribution
of the carriers’ task volumes.
After reviewing the related literature in §2, we formulate the problem between the consol-
idator and the carriers in §3. We analyze the business models in which the consolidator operates
a UCC and a capacity sharing platform in §4 and §5 respectively. We compare the two business
models in terms of the consolidator’s expected profit and the expected social-environmental cost
in §6. We study two extensions of our models in §7, before we provide concluding remarks in
§8. All proofs are provided in the online supplement.
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2 Related literature
This paper is mainly related to two streams of literature. The first stream consists of papers
on UCCs and the second stream is about peer-to-peer platforms. The majority of studies
on UCCs is conceptual and descriptive. McDermott (1975) shows in a survey conducted in
Columbus, Ohio that operating a UCC could bring substantial benefits to the shippers, carriers,
consumers, society, and government. Based on a program in the European network, Dablanc
(2007) concludes that the provision of urban logistics services emerges slowly despite their
growing demand. Allen et al. (2012) review the feasibility studies, trials, and fully operational
schemes of UCCs in 17 countries in the last 40 years.
Some analytical papers on UCCs focus on planning and allocation of delivery jobs among
the carriers. For example, Crainic et al. (2009) consider a two-tier distribution structure and
propose an optimization model to deal with job scheduling, resource management, and route
selection. Handoko et al. (2016) propose an auction mechanism for last-mile delivery to match
a UCC’s truck capacity to the shipments such that the UCC’s profit is maximized. Wang et
al. (2015) study a rolling-horizon auction mechanism with virtual pricing of shipping capacity.
Wang et al. (2018) consider cost uncertainty in last-mile delivery through a UCC, and propose
approaches to solve the winner determination problem of an auction. O¨zener and Ergun (2008)
study a logistics network in which shippers collaborate and bundle their shipment requests to
negotiate better rates with a common carrier. They determine an optimal route covering all the
demands such that the total cost is minimized. To the best of our knowledge, no papers have
formally analyzed the stakeholders’ incentives for a UCC project. Our paper fills the gaps in
the literature by providing a game-theoretical analysis of the carriers’ incentive to participate
in a UCC project.
The ideas of the capacity sharing platform relate our paper to the literature on two-sided
markets (Rochet and Tirole, 2006, Weyl, 2010, Hagiu and Wright, 2015). A typical setting of
a two-sided market involves two types of players. On a platform, independent providers (such
as drivers) offer service to consumers (such as riders). See, for example, Cachon et al. (2017),
Bai et al. (2018), Taylor (2018), Bimpikis et al. (2016), Cohen and Zhang (2017), and Hu and
Zhou (2017). In contrast, a carrier on the platform in our paper is flexible to choose either to
sell his remaining capacity like a service provider or to buy capacity like a consumer.
Several papers in operations management deal with peer-to-peer rental platforms, which are
similar to our capacity sharing platform in spirit. For example, Fraiberger and Sundararajan
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(2015) analyze a peer-to-peer rental market where each consumer is either a supplier or a buyer.
Benjaafar et al. (2018) analyze a model where players with different usage levels make decisions
on whether to own a product. Non-owners can access the product through renting from owners
on a needed basis. Jiang and Tian (2016) consider a setting in which consumers who purchased
a product can derive different usage values and generate income by renting out their purchased
product through a third-party sharing platform. Tian and Jiang (2018) further study how this
consumer-to-consumer product sharing affects a distribution channel. Abhishek et al. (2016)
consider a setting in which a consumer decides whether to purchase a durable good and whether
to rent it when the rental market is available. In the stream of literature above, if an owner
decides to rent out his product, he cannot use the product during the rental period. In contrast,
a carrier on our capacity sharing platform does not rent out his entire truck. Instead, he uses his
remaining truck capacity to deliver goods for another carrier to earn extra revenue. Benjaafar
et al. (2017) consider a ride sharing platform on which individuals may rent out empty seats
from their cars or find a ride. However, different from ride sharing, the carriers’ random task
volumes play a significant role in matching supply with demand of capacity on our capacity
sharing platform. Furthermore, the carriers’ task volumes in our paper can change over time,
which also affect their incentive to use the platform.
The collaboration among the carriers considered in our paper shares some similarity with
the paper by Agarwal and Ergun (2010), which considers the alliance formation among carri-
ers. They study the design of large-scale networks and the allocation of limited capacity on a
transportation network among the carriers in the alliance. Our paper is also related to the lit-
erature of inventory transshipment, which typically considers a wholesaler distributes inventory
to multiple retailers and the inventory can be transshipped among the retailers to fulfill de-
mand. Papers most relevant to our work include Rudi et al. (2001) and Dong and Rudi (2004),
where both the wholesaler’s and the retailers’ profits are considered. However, in this stream of
literature, a player with demand must work with another player with supply to generate profits.
In contrast, the carriers on our platform have the option to deliver by themselves and sell their
remaining capacity to the platform, allowing them to be a seller or a buyer. Our platform model
is also related to the literature of secondary markets, where resellers can buy and sell excess
inventory (see, for example, Lee and Whang (2002), Mendelson and Tunca (2007), Milner and
Kouvelis (2007), Broner et al. (2010), and Chen et al. (2013)). This stream of research focuses
on the impact of secondary markets on supply chains’ or firms’ performance. In contrast, our
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paper compares the UCC with the capacity sharing platform. We do not see such a comparison
in this stream of literature.
3 Problem formulation
We consider a consolidator interacts with carriers i = 1, 2, . . . , n in a two-period setting, where
period t = 1 captures the short-term impact of the consolidation in practice, and period t = 2
captures the long-term impact. In period t = 1, 2, carrier i has a delivery task with volume vit.
We assume vit equals vL with a probability λ, or equals vH (> vL) with a probability 1 − λ,
where λ ∈ [0, 1]. All the delivery tasks in each period must be fulfilled within the period. We
assume each carrier is initially equipped with logistics capability that has a limited delivery
capacity sufficient for his own task in each period.
In each period, the consolidator first decides the pricing of the delivery service and each
carrier then decides whether to deliver on his own or outsource his task to the consolidator. If
carrier i delivers on his own, then the carrier incurs a fixed cost c > 0 and a variable cost per
unit volume m > 0. The fixed cost c includes the maintenance cost for the trucks, the license
and permit fees for the trucks, and the salary of drivers. The variable cost includes the fuel cost
and the loading-unloading cost.
In period 1, if a carrier decides to outsource his task, then he can also choose to eliminate or
keep his logistics capability for the future. It incurs a fixed holding cost h ∈ (0, c) to the carrier
if he chooses to keep his logistics capability. The holding cost h includes the costs to maintain
the unused trucks and to keep some relevant staff. In period 2, if a carrier decides to deliver
on his own, then he needs to reestablish his logistics capability if it is eliminated in period 1.
This incurs a reestablishment cost f > 0 which includes the costs to purchase trucks, to recruit
drivers, and to learn about and reconnect with local clients. Let δ ∈ (0, 1) denote a discount
factor across the two periods. To rule out uninteresting cases, such as the carriers never keep
their logistics capability, we assume h < δf and f > c(vH − vL)/vL.
Based on the above problem setting, we analyze and identify the equilibrium decisions of
the consolidator and the carriers under each business model. We first provide the details and
insights of our analyses in §4 and §5 when the consolidator operates a UCC and a capacity
sharing platform respectively. We then compare the two business models in terms of maximizing
the consolidator’s expected profit and minimizing the expected social-environmental cost in §6.
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4 Business model 1: An urban consolidation center
In this section, we consider the consolidator operates a UCC to serve the carriers for their last-
mile deliveries to the city center. We assume that the UCC owns a fleet of vehicles with a total
capacity that is sufficiently large to accommodate all the carriers’ tasks in each period.
The decision process is as follows. At the start of period t = 1, 2, the UCC first decides the
price per unit volume p¯t of her delivery service. After observing p¯t, each carrier i waits until
his delivery task volume is realized. We assume each carrier i only knows his own realized task
volume and decides independently on how to deliver his task to the city center. Let d¯it denote
the decision of carrier i for period t = 1, 2. In period 1, each carrier i has three possible options
defined as follows. (i) d¯i1 = −1: Carrier i delivers on his own. (ii) d¯i1 = 0: Carrier i uses the
UCC’s service and eliminates his logistics capability. (iii) d¯i1 = 1: Carrier i uses the UCC’s
service and keeps his logistics capability. We assume that each carrier’s delivery capacity has
no value after period 2. Thus, each carrier i has only two possible options in period 2 defined
as follows. (i) d¯i2 = −1: Carrier i delivers on his own. (ii) d¯i2 = 0: Carrier i uses the UCC’s
service. As a result, we have d¯i1 ∈ {−1, 0, 1} and d¯i2 ∈ {−1, 0}, for i = 1, . . . , n. Figure 1 shows
the sequence of decisions in the two periods.
Figure 1: The sequence of decisions in the two periods under the UCC business model
Let nt denote the expected number of carriers who use the UCC’s delivery service in period
t. To serve these carriers, the UCC incurs a fixed delivery cost that depends on nt. Taking
economies of scale into consideration, we assume that the fixed delivery cost equals
√
ntC > 0
(Steinerberger, 2015). Furthermore, the UCC also incurs a variable cost per unit volume M > 0.
To be consistent with reality, we assume the UCC receives a subsidy S > 0 per unit volume of
shipments from the local government or authority.
In each period t in Figure 1, the UCC first sets the price per unit volume p¯t for her service to
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maximize her expected profit. Given the price p¯t and the realized task volume vit, each carrier
i determines his decision d¯it to minimize his cost. We solve the problem in Figure 1 backward
by first determining the optimal decisions of the carriers and the UCC in period 2, before we
find their optimal decisions in period 1 in the following sections.
4.1 Analysis
We first find the optimal decision of each carrier i in period 2. Given the decision d¯i1 in period
1 and the price p¯2 in period 2, carrier i determines his optimal decision d¯
∗
i2 to minimize his cost
in period 2. After that we substitute the optimal responses of all the carriers into the UCC’s
problem to find her optimal price p¯∗2.
Define φ¯i2
(
d¯i2; d¯i1, p¯2
)
as the cost of carrier i in period 2, which is a function of d¯i2 given d¯i1
and p¯2. Each carrier iminimizes his cost φ¯i2
(
d¯i2; d¯i1, p¯2
)
by comparing the following two options:
(i) d¯i2 = −1: Carrier i delivers on his own in period 2, which incurs a cost φ¯i2
(−1; d¯i1, p¯2) =
c+mvi2 −
(∣∣d¯i1∣∣− 1) f . (ii) d¯i2 = 0: Carrier i uses the UCC’s service in period 2, which incurs
a cost φ¯i2
(
0; d¯i1, p¯2
)
= p¯2vi2. The following lemma shows the optimal decision of each carrier i
in period 2.
Lemma 1. (Optimal decision of carrier i in period 2)
1. If carrier i delivers on his own or uses the UCC’s service and keeps his logistics capability
in period 1 (d¯i1 = −1 or 1), then in period 2, carrier i uses the UCC’s service (d¯∗i2 = 0) if
p¯2 ≤ m+ c/vi2, or delivers on his own (d¯∗i2 = −1) otherwise.
2. If carrier i uses the UCC’s service and eliminates his logistics capability in period 1 (d¯i1 = 0),
then in period 2, carrier i uses the UCC’s service (d¯∗i2 = 0) if p¯2 ≤ m+ (c+ f)/vi2, or delivers
on his own (d¯∗i2 = −1) otherwise.
Part 1 of Lemma 1 shows that the carriers in period 1 who deliver on their own (d¯i1 = −1),
or who use the UCC’s service and keep their logistics capability (d¯i1 = 1) will make the same
decision in period 2. This is because in both cases, the carriers own their logistics capability
in period 2, leading to the same delivery cost. Furthermore, Lemma 1 also shows that carrier
i is more likely to use the UCC’s service in period 2 if his task volume in the period is smaller
(because p¯2 ≤ m+ c/vi2 and p¯2 ≤ m+ (c+ f)/vi2 are more likely to hold if vi2 is smaller). In
this case, it is not worthwhile to pay the fixed cost c to deliver on his own. It is also worth
noting that if carrier i uses the UCC’s service and eliminates his logistics capability in period
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1 (d¯i1 = 0), then he is more likely to engage the UCC in period 2 because of the additional
reestablishment cost f .
Let V2 denote the expected total task volume of the carriers who use the UCC’s service in
period 2. Given the carriers’ optimal responses in Lemma 1, the UCC chooses the price p¯2 to
maximize her expected profit in period 2:
p¯i2 (p¯2) = (p¯2 + S −M)V2 −√n2C. (1)
Note that it is non-trivial to optimize p¯2 because it affects not only the unit profit p¯2 + S −M
and volume V2, but also the fixed cost
√
n2C. Although lowering p¯2 will attract more carriers
to use the UCC’s service and increase the volume V2, it will also increase the fixed cost
√
n2C.
Define ne as the number of carriers who use the UCC’s service and eliminate their logistics
capability in period 1 (that is, the carriers with d¯i1 = 0). Note that ne is known in period 2.
The following lemma shows the UCC’s optimal pricing decision in period 2.
Lemma 2. (Optimal decision of the UCC in period 2)
1. If ne > 0, the optimal price of the UCC’s service in period 2 is
p¯∗2 =

m+ (c+ f)/vL, if m < min{b1, b2, b3};
m+ (c+ f)/vH , if b1 ≤ m < min{b4, b5};
m+ c/vL, if max{b2, b4} ≤ m < b6;
m+ c/vH , if m ≥ max{b3, b5, b6}.
2. If ne = 0, the optimal price of the UCC’s service in period 2 is
p¯∗2 =
{
m+ c/vL, if m < b7;
m+ c/vH , if m ≥ b7.
The terms bj , j = 1, . . . , 7, are defined in the proof of Lemma 2 in the online supplement.
Lemma 2 shows that if no carriers eliminate their logistics capability (ne = 0), then the UCC
is forced to charge lower prices to attract the carriers. Note that the proof of Lemma 2 shows
that bj , j = 1, . . . , 7, decrease as the subsidy S increases. Thus, Lemma 2 implies that if the
government provides a higher subsidy to the UCC, the latter can afford to charge a lower price
p¯∗2 for her service.
After obtaining the optimal decisions d¯∗i2 and p¯
∗
2, we use them to find the carriers’ and the
UCC’s optimal decisions in period 1. Similar to the analysis of period 2, we first determine the
optimal decision of each carrier i in period 1. Given p¯1, each carrier i chooses d¯i1 to minimize his
expected total discounted cost Φ¯i
(
d¯i1; p¯1
)
over the two periods by comparing the three options:
d¯i1 = −1, 0, or 1. Note that, to evaluate Φ¯i
(
d¯i1; p¯1
)
, one needs to form some belief about the
number of carriers who use the UCC’s service and eliminate their logistics capability in period
1 (that is, the value of ne). Following Su and Zhang (2008) and Cachon and Swinney (2009),
we seek to identify a subgame perfect Nash Equilibrium with rational expectations. This means
10
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that each player (including the carriers and the UCC) chooses their optimal action given their
belief about how the others will play. Furthermore, these beliefs are correct, which are identical
to the corresponding actions in equilibrium. In our context, all the carriers and the UCC form
the same rational belief n˜e about ne when they optimize their decisions in period 1, and in
equilibrium, n˜e = ne
(
p¯∗1; d¯∗i1, i = 1, 2, . . . , n
)
.
For notational convenience, given d¯i1, define φ¯
∗
i2
(
d¯i1
)
= φ¯i2
(
d¯∗i2
(
d¯i1
)
; d¯i1, p¯
∗
2
(
d¯i1
))
as the
optimal cost of carrier i in period 2. Given p¯1, each carrier i minimizes Φ¯i
(
d¯i1; p¯1
)
by choosing
one of the following options: (i) d¯i1 = −1: Carrier i delivers on his own, which incurs an expected
total discounted cost Φ¯i (−1; p¯1) = c+mvi1 + δφ¯∗i2(−1). (ii) d¯i1 = 0: Carrier i uses the UCC’s
service and eliminates his logistics capability, which incurs an expected total discounted cost
Φ¯i (0; p¯1) = p¯1vi1 +δφ¯
∗
i2(0). (iii) d¯i1 = 1: Carrier i uses the UCC’s service and keeps his logistics
capability, which incurs an expected total discounted cost Φ¯i (1; p¯1) = p¯1vi1 + h+ δφ¯
∗
i2(1). The
following lemma shows the optimal decision of carrier i in period 1.
Lemma 3. (Optimal decision of carrier i in period 1)
1. If n˜e > 0, the optimal decision of carrier i is determined as follows.
(a) If m < min
{
b˜1, b˜2, b˜3
}
, then
d¯∗i1 =
{
1, if p¯1 ≤ m+ (c− h)/vi1;−1, otherwise.
(b) If b˜1 ≤ m < min
{
b˜4, b˜5
}
, then
d¯∗i1 =

1, if p¯1 ≤ m+ (c− h)/vi1 and h ≤ δ(c+ f)(λvL/vH + 1− λ)− δc;
0, if p¯1 ≤ m+ (1 + δ)c/vi1 − δ(c+ f)(λvL/vH + 1− λ)/vi1
and h > δ(c+ f)(λvL/vH + 1− λ)− δc;−1, otherwise.
(c) If max
{
b˜2, b˜4
}
≤ m < b˜6, then
d¯∗i1 =

1, if p¯1 ≤ m+ (c− h)/vi1 and h ≤ δc(λ+ (1− λ)vH/vL)− δc;
0, if p¯1 ≤ m+ (1 + δ)c/vi1 − δc(λ+ (1− λ)vH/vL)/vi1
and h > δc(λ+ (1− λ)vH/vL)− δc;−1, otherwise.
(d) If m ≥ max
{
b˜3, b˜5, b˜6
}
, then
d¯∗i1 =
{
0, if p¯1 ≤ m+ c/vi1;−1, otherwise.
2. If n˜e = 0, the optimal decision of carrier i is determined as follows.
(a) If m < b7, then
d¯∗i1 =

1, if p¯1 ≤ m+ (c− h)/vi1 and h ≤ δc(λ+ (1− λ)vH/vL)− δc;
0, if p¯1 ≤ m+ (1 + δ)c/vi1 − δc(λ+ (1− λ)vH/vL)/vi1
and h > δc(λ+ (1− λ)vH/vL)− δc;−1, otherwise.
(b) If m ≥ b7, then
d¯∗i1 =
{
0, if p¯1 ≤ m+ c/vi1;−1, otherwise.
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The terms b˜j , j = 1, . . . , 6, are defined in the proof of Lemma 3 in the online supplement.
Lemma 3 shows that if the task volume vi1 of carrier i becomes smaller in period 1, then the
carrier is more likely to use the UCC’s service to avoid the fixed cost c. In case carrier i chooses
to use the UCC’s service in period 1, he will eliminate his logistics capability (d¯∗i1 = 0) if m is
sufficiently large (that is, if m ≥ max
{
b˜3, b˜5, b˜6
}
or m ≥ b7); otherwise, he will keep his logistics
capability (d¯∗i1 = 1) if the holding cost h is sufficiently small.
Let V1 denote the expected total task volume of the carriers who use the UCC’s service in
period 1. Recall that p¯i2(p¯
∗
2) is the UCC’s expected profit in period 2 given by Equation (1).
Assuming all the carriers respond optimally according to Lemma 3, the UCC optimizes her
price p¯1 to maximize her expected total discounted profit over the two periods:
Π¯ (p¯1) = (p¯1 + S −M)V1 −√n1C + δp¯i2 (p¯∗2 (p¯1)) . (2)
4.2 Equilibrium decisions
The following theorem determines the rational expectation equilibrium. To rule out unin-
teresting cases in which the carriers never keep their logistics capability, we assume h ≤
min{δ(c+ f)(λvL/vH + 1− λ)− δc, δc(λ+ (1− λ)vH/vL)− δc}.
Theorem 1. (Equilibrium decisions of the UCC model) There are three candidates of
the equilibrium characterized as follows.
1. If m < min{b7,m1}, then we have the following candidate of the equilibrium.
Period 1: The UCC’s equilibrium price is p¯∗1 = m + (c − h)/vL. Under this price, each
carrier i uses the UCC’s service and keeps his logistics capability if vi1 = vL, and
delivers on his own otherwise.
Period 2: The UCC’s equilibrium price is p¯∗2 = m+ c/vL. Under this price, each carrier
i uses the UCC’s service if vi1 = vL, and delivers on his own otherwise.
2. If min{b7,m1} ≤ m < b7, then we have the following candidate of the equilibrium.
Period 1: The UCC’s equilibrium price is p¯∗1 = m+ (c− h)/vH . Under this price, all the
carriers use the UCC’s service and keep their logistics capability.
Period 2: The UCC’s equilibrium price is p¯∗2 = m+ c/vL. Under this price, each carrier
i uses the UCC’s service if vi1 = vL, and delivers on his own otherwise.
3. If m ≥ max{m2,m3,m4}, then we have the following candidate of the equilibrium.
Period 1: The UCC’s equilibrium price is p¯∗1 = m+c/vL. Under this price, each carrier i
uses the UCC’s service and eliminates his logistics capability if vi1 = vL, and delivers
on his own otherwise.
Period 2: The UCC’s equilibrium price is p¯∗2 = m + c/vH . Under this price, all the
carriers use the UCC’s service.
The terms mj , j = 1, . . . , 4, are defined in the proof of Theorem 1 in the online supplement. Note
that the three intervals of m in Theorem 1 may overlap. Given a set of parameters (including
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m), the equilibrium is the candidate with the highest expected total discounted profit for the
UCC. According to the proof of Theorem 1, mj , j = 1, . . . , 4, decrease as the subsidy S increases.
Thus, if the government provides a higher subsidy S to the UCC, then the third equilibrium
in Theorem 1 becomes more likely to exist (that is, m ≥ max{m2,m3,m4} becomes easier to
hold). Since all the carriers will use the UCC’s service in period 2 in this equilibrium, the UCC
is more likely to sustain in the long run. This result is aligned with the observation that many
UCC projects require government subsidies in practice.
The equilibrium of the UCC model can be characterized by the reestablishment cost f and
the variable delivery cost m. Figure 2(a) shows the UCC’s equilibrium price in period 1. If
f is sufficiently small (corresponding to the left end of Figure 2(a)), then the UCC’s price p¯∗1
increases as m increases. This is because if m is getting larger, the carriers are more likely to
use the UCC’s service. Anticipating this, the UCC charges a higher price in period 1.
(a) The UCC’s equilibrium pricing strategy (b) The equilibrium decisions of the carriers using
the UCC’s service
Figure 2: The equilibrium decisions in period 1 under the UCC model
Figure 2(b) illustrates the equilibrium decisions of the carriers who use the UCC’s service
in period 1. If f is sufficiently small and m is sufficiently large (corresponding to the top-left
corner of Figure 2(b)), then the carriers who use the UCC’s service will eliminate their logistics
capability. This is because the carriers anticipate that they are likely to continue to use the
UCC’s service in period 2. Even if they need to deliver on their own in period 2, it is affordable
to reestablish their logistics capability. In contrast, if f is sufficiently large and m is sufficiently
small (corresponding to the bottom-right corner of Figure 2(b)), the carriers who use the UCC’s
service will keep their logistics capability. Furthermore, as m increases all the carriers will use
the UCC’s service and keep their logistics capability.
Figures 3(a) and (b) show the UCC’s equilibrium price and the carriers who use the UCC’s
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(a) The UCC’s equilibrium pricing strategy (b) Carriers using the UCC’s service in equilib-
rium
Figure 3: The equilibrium decisions in period 2 under the UCC model
service, respectively, in period 2. If f is sufficiently small and m is sufficiently large, all the
carriers will use the UCC’s service (see the top-left corner of Figure 3(b)). However, as f
increases and m decreases, the carriers will keep their logistics capability in period 1 (see the
bottom-right corner of Figure 2(b)), thus fewer carriers will use the UCC’s service in period 2
(see the bottom-right corner of Figure 3(b)).
In general, as m increases, the carriers are more dependent on the UCC to deliver their
tasks. That is, in period 1 the carriers who use the UCC’s service will eliminate their logistics
capability, and in period 2 more carriers will use the UCC’s service. However, as f increases,
the carriers become less dependent on the UCC. That is, in period 1 the carriers who use the
UCC’s service will keep their logistics capability, and in period 2 fewer carriers will use the
UCC’s service.
5 Business model 2: A capacity sharing platform
In this section, instead of having a physical UCC, we consider the consolidator operates a
platform for the carriers to share their delivery capacity. On the platform, a carrier delivering
by himself to the city center can sell his remaining truck capacity to another carrier, so that
the latter can outsource his delivery task by paying a fee. If the transaction is successful,
then the platform retains a portion of this fee as her revenue. Motivated by the fact that the
delivery capacity of each individual carrier is usually very limited compared to the UCC’s fleet,
we assume that a high task volume means a full or nearly-full truckload for a carrier. Thus,
in contrast to the UCC model, if vit = vH , then carrier i has to deliver by himself to the city
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center in period t (the other carriers cannot help him) and his remaining capacity is insufficient
to help any other carrier to deliver. Thus, in each period t, only carrier i with vit = vL will
participate (purchase or sell capacity) in the capacity sharing platform. We assume that each
carrier participating in the platform can serve (or can be served by) at most one other carrier
on the platform. For convenience, define N = {1, 2, . . . , n}, NL,t = {i|vit = vL, i ∈ N}, and
NH,t = {i|vit = vH , i ∈ N}, for t = 1, 2.
The decision process is as follows. At the start of each period t, the platform first decides
the price per unit volume pˆt of the delivery service. After observing the price pˆt, each carrier i
waits until his delivery task volume vit is realized, and decides independently on how to deliver
his task to the city center. Let dˆit denote the decision of carrier i for period t = 1, 2. In period
1, each carrier i ∈ NL,1 has three possible options. (i) dˆi1 = −1: Carrier i delivers on his own
and sells his remaining capacity to the platform. (ii) dˆi1 = 0: Carrier i purchases capacity from
the platform and eliminates his logistics capability. (iii) dˆi1 = 1: Carrier i purchases capacity
from the platform and keeps his logistics capability. In consistent with the UCC model, we
assume that all the delivery capacity has no value after period 2. Thus, in period 2 each carrier
i ∈ NL,2 has only two possible options defined as follows. (i) dˆi2 = −1: Carrier i delivers on his
own and sells his remaining capacity to the platform. (ii) dˆi2 = 0: Carrier i purchases capacity
from the platform. As a result, for i ∈ NL,1, we have dˆi1 ∈ {−1, 0, 1}, and for i ∈ NL,2, we have
dˆi2 ∈ {−1, 0}. Figure 4 shows the sequence of decisions in the two periods.
Figure 4: The sequence of decisions in the two periods under the platform business model
If carrier i ∈ NL,t wants to sell his remaining capacity to the platform, whether his capacity
can be successfully sold depends on the demand and the supply of capacity on the platform.
If the demand is no less than the supply, then all the carriers who wish to sell their remaining
capacity can successfully sell it. However, if the demand is less than the supply, then only a
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subset of these carriers can sell their remaining capacity. In this situation, the platform will
randomly distribute the tasks with an equal probability to the carriers willing to sell their
remaining capacity.
Given that all the delivery tasks must be fulfilled in each period t, if carrier i ∈ NL,t wants
to purchase capacity from the platform, we assume the carrier can always obtain the required
capacity vL. The platform can guarantee this by outsourcing the delivery task of carrier i to
an external party, if necessary. We assume that the platform does not make any profit in this
outsourcing process. If carrier i ∈ NL,t purchases capacity in period t (dˆit = 0 or 1), then he
pays pˆtvL. If there is enough supply on the platform, the platform receives a portion αpˆtvL,
where α ∈ (0, 1) represents the platform’s revenue share. The remaining portion (1 − α)pˆtvL
goes to the other carrier on the platform who serves carrier i. To ensure that selling capacity
on the platform is profitable, we assume (1− α)pˆt > m.
For notational convenience, define ns,t as the expected number of carriers who deliver on
their own and sell their remaining capacity to the platform in period t (that is, the carriers
who choose dˆit = −1). Define np,t as the expected number of carriers who purchase capacity
from the platform in period t (that is, the carriers who choose dˆi1 = 0 or 1 in period 1, and the
carriers who choose dˆi2 = 0 in period 2). Therefore, the supply and the demand of capacity on
the platform in period t are propotional to ns,t and np,t respectively.
For each period t in Figure 4, the platform first sets the price per unit volume pˆt to maximize
her expected profit. Given the price pˆt and the realized task volume vit, each carrier i ∈ NL,t
determines his decision dˆit to minimize his expected cost. We solve the problem in Figure 4
backward by first identifying the optimal decisions of each carrier i ∈ NL,2 and the platform in
period 2, before we find their optimal decisions in period 1 in the following sections.
5.1 Analysis
Given the decision dˆi1 in period 1 and the price pˆ2 in period 2, we first determine the optimal
decision dˆ∗i2 of each carrier i ∈ NL,2 to minimize his expected cost. After that we substitute the
carriers’ optimal responses into the platform’s problem to find her optimal price pˆ∗2.
Each carrier i ∈ NL,2 minimizes his expected cost φˆi2
(
dˆi2; dˆi1, pˆ2
)
in period 2 by comparing
the two options: dˆi2 = −1 or 0. If carrier i delivers by himself and sells his remaining capacity to
the platform (dˆi2 = −1), then the expected revenue generated from selling his remaining capacity
depends on the supply (proportional to ns,2) and the demand (proportional to np,2) of capacity
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on the platform in period 2. Following Su and Zhang (2008) and Cachon and Swinney (2009), we
aim to identify a subgame perfect Nash Equilibrium with rational expectations. We assume all
the carriers in NL,2 form the same rational beliefs n˜s,2 and n˜p,2 about ns,2 and np,2, respectively,
when they optimize their decisions in period 2. Furthermore, n˜s,2 = ns,2
(
dˆ∗i2, i ∈ NL,2
)
and
n˜p,2 = np,2
(
dˆ∗i2, i ∈ NL,2
)
in equilibrium. Define θt = min {n˜p,t/n˜s,t, 1}, for t = 1, 2.
Specifically, each carrier i ∈ NL,2 minimizes φˆi2
(
dˆi2; dˆi1, pˆ2
)
by comparing the following op-
tions. (i) dˆi2 = −1: Carrier i delivers on his own and sells his remaining capacity to the platform,
which incurs an expected cost φˆi2
(
−1; dˆi1, pˆ2
)
= c+mvL−
(∣∣∣dˆi1∣∣∣− 1) f−θ2 [(1− α)pˆ2 −m] vL.
(ii) dˆi2 = 0: Carrier i purchases capacity from the platform, incurring a cost φˆi2
(
0; dˆi1, pˆ2
)
=
pˆ2vL. Note that for both periods 1 and 2, if the cost of delivering by himself is identical to the
cost of purchasing capacity from the platform, we assume that carrier i will choose either option
with an equal probability. This random tie-breaking rule is to avoid the extreme situation where
the carriers with identical costs choose the same option on the platform.
After we determine the optimal decision dˆ∗i2 of carrier i ∈ NL,2, we can substitute it into the
platform’s problem to find her optimal price in period 2. The platform chooses pˆ2 to maximize
her expected profit in period 2:
pˆi2 (pˆ2) = αpˆ2vL min {ns,2, np,2} . (3)
After obtaining the optimal decisions dˆ∗i2 and pˆ
∗
2 in period 2, we use them to find the carriers’
and the platform’s optimal decisions in period 1.
Each carrier i ∈ NL,1 in period 1 minimizes his expected total discounted cost Φˆi
(
dˆi1; pˆ1
)
over the two periods by comparing the three options: dˆi1 = −1, 0, or 1. If dˆi1 = −1, then the
expected cost of carrier i in period 1 depends on ns,1 and np,1. Similar to period 2, we assume all
the carriers in NL,1 form the same rational beliefs n˜s,1 and n˜p,1 about ns,1 and np,1 respectively.
Furthermore, n˜s,1 = ns,1
(
dˆ∗i1, i ∈ NL,1
)
and n˜p,1 = np,1
(
dˆ∗i1, i ∈ NL,1
)
in equilibrium. For
notational convenience, given dˆi1, define φˆ
∗
i2
(
dˆi1
)
= φˆi2
(
dˆ∗i2
(
dˆi1
)
; dˆi1, pˆ
∗
2
(
dˆi1
))
as the optimal
expected cost of carrier i in period 2. Given pˆ1, carrier i ∈ NL,1 minimizes Φˆi
(
dˆi1; pˆ1
)
by
choosing one of the following options:
(i) dˆi1 = −1: Carrier i delivers on his own and sells his remaining capacity to the platform, which
incurs an expected total discounted cost Φˆi (−1; pˆ1) = c+mvL−θ1 [(1− α)pˆ1 −m] vL+δφˆ∗i2(−1).
(ii) dˆi1 = 0: Carrier i purchases capacity from the platform and eliminates his logistics capability,
which incurs an expected total discounted cost Φˆi (0; pˆ1) = pˆ1vL + δφˆ
∗
i2(0).
(iii) dˆi1 = 1: Carrier i purchases capacity from the platform and keeps his logistics capability,
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which incurs an expected total discounted cost Φˆi (1; pˆ1) = pˆ1vL + h+ δφˆ
∗
i2(1).
We then substitute all the carriers’ optimal responses dˆ∗i1 into the platform’s problem to find
her optimal price pˆ∗1 that maximizes her expected total discounted profit:
Πˆ (pˆ1) = αpˆ1vL min {ns,1, np,1}+ δpˆi2 (pˆ∗2 (pˆ1)) , (4)
where pˆi2 (pˆ
∗
2 (pˆ1)) represents the platform’s optimal expected profit in period 2 given pˆ1 (see
Equation (3)).
5.2 Equilibrium decisions
The following theorem summarizes the platform’s and the carriers’ decisions for each period
in the equilibrium with rational expectations. Define f =
(2−2λ+αλ2
4
)mvL+(1− 3λ2 +
λ(λ+α)
4
)c
(2−α)λ
2
(1−λ
4
)
and
f ′ = (2−3λ+
αλ2
2
)mvL+(1− 5λ2 +λ2+
αλ(2−λ)
4
)c
(2−α)λ
2
(2−λ) .
Theorem 2. (Equilibrium decisions of the platform model)
1. If f ≥ hδ(1−λ) , then we have the following results.
Period 1: The platform’s equilibrium price is pˆ∗1 = (c + 2mvL − h)/[(2 − α)vL]. Under this
price, each carrier i ∈ NL,1 chooses dˆ∗i1 = −1 or dˆ∗i1 = 1 with an equal probability.
Period 2: The platform’s equilibrium price is pˆ∗2 = (c + 2mvL)/[(2 − α)vL]. Under this price,
each carrier i ∈ NL,2 chooses dˆ∗i2 = −1 or dˆ∗i2 = 0 with an equal probability.
2. If f < min
{
h
δ(1−λ) , f , f
′
}
, then we have the following results.
Period 1: The platform’s equilibrium price is pˆ∗1 = [c+ 2mvL − δ(1− λ)f ]/[(2− α)vL]. Under
this price, each carrier i ∈ NL,1 chooses dˆ∗i1 = −1 or dˆ∗i1 = 0 with an equal probability.
Period 2: The platform’s equilibrium price is pˆ∗2 = (c + 2mvL)/[(2 − α)vL]. Under this price,
carrier i ∈ NL,2 chooses dˆ∗i2 = −1 or dˆ∗i2 = 0 with an equal probability, if dˆ∗i1 = −1; or
chooses dˆ∗i2 = 0, if dˆ
∗
i1 = 0.
Theorem 2 shows that, in general, the platform sets the prices to match the supply and
demand of capacity so that a carrier chooses to sell or purchase capacity from the platform
with an equal probability. Theorem 2 is illustrated by Figures 5 and 6. Figure 5(a) shows the
platform’s equilibrium price in period 1. Figure 5(b) shows that each carrier i ∈ NL,1 sells or
purchases capacity on the platform in period 1 with an equal probability. If the reestablishment
cost f is sufficiently large (f ≥ h/[δ(1− λ)]), then the carriers who purchase capacity from the
platform should keep their logistics capability. Otherwise, these carriers should eliminate their
logistics capability.
Figures 6(a) and (b) show the equilibrium decisions of the platform and each carrier i ∈ NL,2,
respectively, in period 2. Figure 6(b) shows that if f ≥ h/[δ(1 − λ)], then each carrier i sells
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(a) The platform’s equilibrium pricing strategy (b) The equilibrium decision of each carrier
Figure 5: The equilibrium decisions of the platform and each carrier i in period 1
or purchases capacity on the platform in period 2 with an equal probability. Otherwise, the
carrier’s decision depends on his decision in period 1. If he delivers on his own in period 1 (that
is, dˆ∗i1 = −1), then he sells or purchases capacity on the platform in period 2 with an equal
probability. On the other hand, the carriers who purchase capacity and eliminate their logistics
capability in period 1 (that is, dˆ∗i1 = 0) will continue to purchase capacity from the platform in
period 2. In this situation, although the reestablishment cost f is affordable, but with a large
variable delivery cost m, it is expensive to make their own delivery.
(a) The platform’s equilibrium pricing strategy (b) The equilibrium decision of each carrier
Figure 6: The equilibrium decisions of the platform and each carrier i in period 2
6 Comparing the UCC and the capacity sharing platform
We compare the performance of the UCC and the capacity sharing platform in terms of the
expected profit and the expected social-environmental cost. We focus on three regions where
the equilibria exist in both models: (i) When f is sufficiently small and m is sufficiently large:
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f < min
{
h
δ(1−λ) , f1, f2
}
and m > max{b7,m4,m5,m6}. (ii) When f is sufficiently large and
m is intermediate: f > max
{
h
δ(1−λ) , f1, f2, f3, f4
}
and min{b7,m1} ≤ m < b7. (iii) When
f is sufficiently large and m is sufficiently small: f > max
{
h
δ(1−λ) , f1, f2, f3, f4
}
and m <
min{b7,m1}. The terms m5,m6, and fj , j = 1, . . . , 4 are defined in the proof of Theorem 3 in
the online supplement.
6.1 Expected profit
Between the UCC and the platform, which business model is more profitable for the consolida-
tor? As discussed in Section 1, it is important to make the consolidator financially sustainable
in order to achieve the benefits of consolidation. We determine the consolidator’s preference by
comparing the equilibrium profits Π¯ (p¯∗1) of the UCC in §4 and Πˆ (pˆ∗1) of the capacity sharing
platform in §5. The following theorem identifies the conditions under which the UCC (or the
platform) is more profitable for the consolidator.
Theorem 3. (Comparing the UCC’s and the platform’s profits) In each region, the
UCC is more profitable than the platform (Π¯ (p¯∗1) > Πˆ (pˆ∗1)) if and only if
Region (i): c > c1;
Region (ii): one of the following conditions holds: (a) c > c2 and δ > δ1, (b) c < c2 and δ < δ1;
Region (iii): one of the following conditions holds: (a) c > c3, (b) h < h1.
In Region (i), the UCC is more profitable than the platform if the carriers’ fixed delivery cost
c > c1. This is because when c is large, the carriers are more likely to outsource their delivery
tasks to avoid the fixed cost. This will benefit the consolidator if she operates a UCC because
there will be many carriers using her service. On the other hand, if the consolidator operates
a platform, there will not be many successful transactions because the supply of capacity is
low. This reduces her profit. Furthermore, the proof of Theorem 3 shows that c1 decreases
with n and S. As n increases, the carriers enjoy more savings by using the UCC because of
the economies of scale in shipment consolidation, making the UCC more likely to outperform
the platform. The UCC also becomes more dominant as the government subsidy S increases.
If c < c1, then the carriers are more likely to deliver on their own. Thus, more capacity will be
available on the platform, making the platform more profitable than the UCC.
In Region (ii), the UCC is more profitable than the platform if both the fixed delivery cost
c and the discount factor δ are large (c > c2 and δ > δ1). A large c pushes more carriers
to outsource their delivery tasks. Furthermore, a large reestablishment cost f persuades the
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carriers who eliminate their logistics capability to continue outsourcing the delivery in the long
run. A large δ magnifies this effect. Under the platform model, these carriers are less likely to
supply capacity in period 2. This creates excessive demand for capacity on the platform, leading
to a severe imbalance of supply and demand, which yields a lower profit for the platform. On
the other hand, if δ is small (c > c2 and δ < δ1), the carriers are less sensitive to their costs in
period 2 and become more likely to do their own delivery. This mitigates the supply-demand
imbalance on the platform, making the platform more profitable than the UCC.
In contrast, if both c and δ are small (c < c2 and δ < δ1), the affordable delivery costs (small
c and intermediate m) attract more carriers to deliver on their own. This is especially so for
a small δ, which encourages the carriers, who eliminate their logistics capability in period 1,
to deliver on their own in period 2. This creates excessive supply of capacity on the platform,
which reduces the number of successful transactions, making the platform less profitable than
the UCC. However, if δ is large (c < c2 and δ > δ1), the large f makes the carriers, who eliminate
their logistics capability in period 1, to outsource their delivery tasks in period 2. This increases
the demand for capacity on the platform, which mitigates the imbalance of supply and demand,
leading to a higher profit for the platform than the UCC.
Lastly, in Region (iii), the UCC is more profitable than the platform if c > c3 because of the
same reason mentioned in Region (i). The second condition (h < h1) for the UCC to outperform
the platform needs more explanations. We first consider the opposite case with h > h1. If the
holding cost h is large, the carriers are less likely to hold their logistics capability in period 1.
Meanwhile, the large f deters the carriers from eliminating their logistics capability. Therefore,
more carriers will deliver on their own to avoid these large costs, reducing the UCC’s profit.
However, if h is small, then the carriers can always use the UCC’s service and hold their logistics
capability in period 1, avoiding a costly reestablishment in the next period. This makes the
UCC more profitable than the platform. Furthermore, the proof of Theorem 3 shows that c3
decreases and h1 increases with n, making it easier for the UCC to dominate as n increases.
6.2 Expected social-environmental cost
Between the UCC and the platform, which business model is more efficient for the consolidator
to reduce the social-environmental cost? As a result of the consolidation, both the UCC and
the platform yield higher truck utilization with fewer trucks used. This not only economically
benefits the consolidator and the carriers, but also mitigates the social-environmental impact
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(in terms of reduced congestion and pollution) because of reduced traffic to the city center. In
this section, we compare the UCC and the platform with respect to their impact to the society
and the environment.
To quantify the impact, define ψ as the social-environmental cost associated with a carrier’s
delivery to the city center. This includes, for example, the cost to the society due to congestion
and the cost to the environment due to pollution. Define ∆¯ψ and ∆ˆψ as the expected total
social-environmental cost reduction achieved by the UCC and the platform respectively. Under
the UCC model, although additional trucks are required, each UCC’s truck can potentially
consolidate multiple tasks. In contrast, under the platform model, although no additional
trucks are required, each carrier can at most serve one other carrier’s task. It is unclear that
which business model is more effective in reducing the social-environmental cost.
We first analyze the expected total social-environmental cost reduction achieved by the UCC.
Recall that nt represents the expected number of carriers served by the UCC in period t = 1, 2.
Using the same setup cost’s formula due to the consolidation by the UCC in §4, the expected
total social-environmental cost in each period t is reduced from nψ to
√
ntψ + (n− nt)ψ. This
leads to ∆¯ψ = nψ − [√n1ψ + (n− n1)ψ] + nψ − [√n2ψ + (n− n2)ψ].
In contrast, the task of a carrier who purchases capacity from the platform is fulfilled by
another carrier, leading to a social-environmental cost reduction ψ. In case the platform does not
have sufficient supply of capacity, we assume that the unmatched delivery tasks are outsourced
to a third party without incurring any additional social-environmental cost. Recall that np,t
represents the expected number of carriers who purchase capacity from the platform in period
t. The expected total social-environmental cost reduction in each period t is np,tψ. Thus, we
have ∆ˆψ = np,1ψ + np,2ψ.
The following theorem compares ∆¯ψ and ∆ˆψ. We focus on the same three regions in Theorem
3 where the equilibria exist in both models.
Theorem 4. (Comparing the UCC’s and the platform’s social-environmental cost
reductions) In each region, the UCC is more efficient than the platform in reducing the expected
total social-environmental cost (∆¯ψ > ∆ˆψ) if and only if
Region (i): n >
(
1+
√
λ
1−λ/4
)2
;
Region (ii): n >
(
1 +
√
λ
)2
;
Region (iii): n > 4/λ.
Theorem 4 shows that if the number of carriers n is large, then the UCC is more efficient
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in reducing the social-environmental cost than the platform. This is because if n is large, the
UCC’s trucks (each can serve multiple tasks) can achieve a larger economy of scale in shipment
consolidation. This significantly reduces the traffic congestion and pollution caused by the
last-mile delivery. On the other hand, if n is small, the UCC may not be efficient in reducing
the social-environmental cost. In contrast, the platform, which matches a carrier’s task with
another carrier without employing any additional trucks, becomes more efficient.
(i) (ii) (iii)
Figure 7: Thresholds of n in Regions (i), (ii), and (iii)
Figure 7 shows how the threshold of n in each region varies with the probability of low
task volume λ. In Regions (i) and (ii), as λ increases, the thresholds
(
1+
√
λ
1−λ/4
)2
and
(
1 +
√
λ
)2
also increase, making the platform more likely to outperform the UCC in reducing the social-
environmental cost. As λ increases, more carriers will engage the platform. Many of these carri-
ers want to purchase capacity from the platform because of the large and intermediate variable
delivery cost m in Regions (i) and (ii). This significantly reduces the social-environmental cost,
making the platform more efficient than the UCC.
In Region (iii), as λ increases, the threshold 4/λ decreases, making the UCC more likely
to outperform the platform in reducing the social-environmental cost. This is because as λ
increases, more carriers will engage the platform. However, the large f and small m in Region
(iii) make the carriers more likely to deliver on their own. This is especially so under the
platform model because the carriers can earn extra revenue by selling their remaining capacity.
In contrast, the UCC can achieve a larger scale of shipment consolidation, which reduces the
social-environmental cost more efficiently than the platform.
Table 1 shows the consolidator’s preferred business model with respect to the profit and the
social-environmental impact. To maximize the expected profit, the consolidator should choose
the UCC if the carriers’ fixed delivery cost c is large in general. Otherwise, the capacity sharing
platform is preferred. To minimize the expected social-environmental cost, the UCC is preferred
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if the number of carriers n is large. Otherwise, the consolidator should choose the platform.
Table 1: The preferred business model of the consolidator
small c small c large c large c
small n large n small n large n
To maximize
expected profit platform platform UCC UCC
To minimize expected
social-environmental cost platform UCC platform UCC
7 Extensions
7.1 A hybrid model
We consider the consolidator operates a hybrid business model that combines the ideas of both
the UCC and the capacity sharing platform. In this hybrid model, the consolidator simultane-
ously operates a UCC, which fulfills the carriers’ delivery tasks, and a platform, which matches
supply and demand for capacity among the carriers. This hybrid model is inspired by Amazon
that sells products to consumers by itself, and also allows peer-to-peer selling on its platform.
For analytical tractability, we consider a one-period model in which the consolidator operates
both the UCC and the platform. Through the UCC, the consolidator charges the carriers for
her delivery service. Through the platform, the consolidator receives a revenue share α ∈ (0, 1)
from each successful transaction of capacity. The consolidator first chooses the prices p¯ and pˆ
per unit volume of delivery service for the UCC and the platform, respectively, to maximize her
expected profit.
After observing the prices p¯ and pˆ, each carrier i waits until his delivery task volume vi is
realized. Depending on vi, each carrier i has different options to fulfill his task. If vi = vL
(which occurs with a probability λ), then carrier i has three possible options: (i) He delivers on
his own and sells his remaining capacity to the platform. (ii) He uses the UCC’s service. (iii)
He purchases capacity from the platform. If vi = vH (which occurs with a probability 1 − λ),
then carrier i has two possible options: (i) He delivers on his own. (ii) He uses the UCC’s
service. Each carrier independently decides how to fulfill his task to minimize his expected
cost. To ensure that selling capacity on the platform is profitable and the options do not always
dominate each other, we assume m < (1 − α)pˆ < (1/vL − 1/vH) c. The following theorem
summarizes the consolidator’s and the carriers’ equilibrium decisions.
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Theorem 5. (Equilibrium decisions of the hybrid model)
1. If m < min{m7,m8}, then it is optimal for the consolidator to charge any p¯∗ > (c +
2mvL)/((2 − α)vL) and pˆ∗ = (c + 2mvL)/((2 − α)vL). Under these prices, each carrier i with
vi = vH delivers on his own, and each carrier i with vi = vL delivers on his own (and sells
his remaining capacity to the platform) or purchases capacity from the platform with an equal
probability.
2. If m7 ≤ m < m9, then it is optimal for the consolidator to charge p¯∗ = m + c/vL and any
pˆ∗ ≥ m + c/vL. Under these prices, each carrier i with vi = vH delivers on his own, and each
carrier i with vi = vL uses the UCC’s service.
3. If m ≥ max{m8,m9}, then it is optimal for the consolidator to charge p¯∗ = m + c/vH and
any pˆ∗ ≥ m+ c/vL. Under these prices, all the carriers use the UCC’s service.
The terms mj , j = 7, . . . , 9, are defined in the proof of Theorem 5 in the online supplement.
The conditions of the above equilibrium result determine the source from which the consol-
idator generates her profit. If the carriers’ variable delivery cost m is small (m < min{m7,m8}),
then the consolidator will generate profit from the platform. This is because the affordable de-
livery cost m makes it difficult to attract the carriers to use the UCC’s service. However, as
m becomes moderate or large (m7 ≤ m < m9 or m ≥ max{m8,m9}), more carriers would like
to outsource their delivery tasks. Specifically, if m7 ≤ m < m9, then only the carriers with a
high task volume will deliver on their own. If m ≥ max{m8,m9}, then no carriers will make
their own delivery. Both cases eliminate the supply of capacity on the platform. Thus, the
consolidator will optimize her prices to induce the carriers to engage the UCC (rather than the
platform), such that her expected profit is maximized. In both cases, the consolidator generates
profit from the UCC.
Note that some equilibrium in Theorem 5 leads to a lower social-environmental cost than
the others. For example, it is straightforward to show that if n > 1/(1− λ/2)2, then the third
equilibrium (when m ≥ max{m8,m9}) results in the lowest expected total social-environmental
cost. In this equilibrium, all the carriers use the UCC’s service. The government can promote
the third equilibrium by increasing the variable delivery cost m, such as imposing variable tax
to the carriers who deliver on their own. Furthermore, the proof of Theorem 5 shows that
m7,m8, and m9 decrease with the government subsidy S for the UCC’s service. Thus, to make
the third equilibrium more achievable, the government can provide a higher subsidy to the
consolidator for the UCC’s service. Conversely, if n ≤ 1/(1 − λ/2)2, then the first equilibrium
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(when m < min{m7,m8}) yields the lowest social-environmental cost. In this equilibrium, all
the carriers with a low task volume sell or purchase capacity on the platform. In this situation,
the government can act in a reverse manner to make the first equilibrium more attainable.
7.2 Demand correlation
In the UCC and the platform models, some carriers are reluctant to eliminate their logistics
capability in period 1 because of the reestablishment cost f . This decision depends on the
carrier’s delivery task volume in the next period. In practice, each carrier’s demands across the
periods are sometimes correlated such that the carriers can roughly predict their task volumes
in the near future. This helps them plan ahead with their logistics requirement.
In this section, we analyze the UCC model with correlated demands for each carrier between
the two periods. Specifically, we assume the demands for each carrier in the two periods are
positively correlated. That is, if the carrier’s task volume is low (high) in period 1, then his
task volume is also low (high) in period 2. The rest of the model is identical to that of §4. The
following theorem summarizes the equilibrium results.
Theorem 6. (Equilibrium decisions of the UCC model with correlated demands)
Assume h ≤ min{δ(c+ f)vL/vH − δc, δc(vH/vL − 1)}. There are three cases:
1. If max{m11,m12} ≤ m < min{m4,m10}, then we have the following results.
Period 1: The UCC’s equilibrium price is p¯∗1 = m+c/vL. Under this price, each carrier i
uses the UCC’s service and eliminates his logistics capability if vi1 = vL, and delivers
on his own otherwise.
Period 2: The UCC’s equilibrium price is p¯∗2 = m+ c/vL. Under this price, each carrier
i uses the UCC’s service if vi1 = vL, and delivers on his own otherwise.
2. If max{m10,m11,m12} ≤ m < m4, then we have the following results.
Period 1: The UCC’s equilibrium price is p¯∗1 = m + (c − h)/vH . Under this price, each
carrier i uses the UCC’s service and eliminates his logistics capability if vi1 = vL,
and uses the UCC’s service and keeps his logistics capability otherwise.
Period 2: The UCC’s equilibrium price is p¯∗2 = m+ c/vL. Under this price, each carrier
i uses the UCC’s service if vi1 = vL, and delivers on his own otherwise.
3. If m ≥ max{m2,m3,m4}, then we have the following results.
Period 1: The UCC’s equilibrium price is p¯∗1 = m+c/vL. Under this price, each carrier i
uses the UCC’s service and eliminates his logistics capability if vi1 = vL, and delivers
on his own otherwise.
Period 2: The UCC’s equilibrium price is p¯∗2 = m + c/vH . Under this price, all the
carriers use the UCC’s service.
The terms mj , j = 10, . . . , 12, are defined in the proof of Theorem 6. Note that the carriers
eliminate their logistics capability in period 1 if they will continue to use the UCC’s service in
period 2. On the other hand, the carriers keep their logistics capability in period 1 if they will
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deliver on their own in period 2. This is because in period 1 the carriers already know their
task volumes in the future, so they can plan ahead with their logistics capability.
We also analyze the platform model with positively correlated demands across the two
periods for each carrier. We find that there is no Nash Equilibrium with rational expectations
in that model. This is because if the expected number of carriers who eliminate their logistics
capability in period 1 is small, then the carriers anticipate that the platform will charge a low
price in period 2. This in turn encourages the carriers to eliminate their logistics capability
in period 1, leading to deviations. Similar deviations exist if the expected number of carriers
eliminating their logistics capability in period 1 is large. Therefore, there is no equilibrium.
We have also obtained the equilibrium results for the UCC and the platform models for a case
where each carrier’s task volumes across the two periods are negatively correlated. Compared
to Theorem 6, the negative demand correlation induces more carriers to use the UCC’s service.
We omit the details here.
8 Conclusion
We study how a consolidator can make urban last-mile delivery more economically and social-
environmentally sustainable. Specifically, the consolidator can choose to operate a UCC or a
capacity sharing platform. Under the UCC business model, the consolidator requires a sorting
facility and a fleet of trucks to deliver the tasks of carriers. The consolidator bears the delivery
costs, but charges the carriers a service fee for the last-mile delivery. Under the capacity sharing
platform business model, the consolidator operates a platform for the carriers to share their
delivery capacity. The consolidator does not need a facility and trucks. There is no delivery
cost incurred to the consolidator, who receives a revenue share from each successful transaction
of capacity on the platform.
For each business model, we develop a two-period game-theoretical model capturing the
interactions between the consolidator and the multiple carriers. In each period, the consolidator
first determines the delivery fee per unit volume to maximize her expected profit. Then, after
knowing his task volume, each carrier minimizes his expected cost by choosing to (i) deliver on
his own, (ii) use the consolidator’s service and eliminate his own logistics capability, or (iii) use
the consolidator’s service but keep his own logistics capability.
In practice, the carriers under the UCC business model face the following trade-off: They can
potentially save their delivery costs by using the UCC’s service, but they are subject to the risk
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of eliminating their logistics capability. Our game-theoretical model delicately demonstrates this
trade-off through its equilibrium results (see Figures 2 and 3). As the carriers’ variable delivery
cost m increases, they become more dependent on the UCC: In period 1 the carriers who use
the UCC’s service will eliminate their logistics capability, and in period 2 more carriers will use
the UCC’s service. On the other hand, as the carriers’ logistics reestablishment cost f increases,
they become less dependent on the UCC: In period 1 the carriers who use the UCC’s service
will keep their logistics capability, and in period 2 fewer carriers will use the UCC’s service. We
also find that if the UCC receives a sufficient government subsidy, then all the carriers will use
the UCC’s service in period 2, making the UCC more sustainable in the long run. This echoes
the phenomenon in practice that many UCC projects rely on government subsidies.
Under the capacity sharing platform model, the carriers generally have their logistics capa-
bility on hand in equilibrium (even if they purchase capacity from the platform). This ensures
sufficient capacity available on the platform to facilitate successful transactions. Since the plat-
form can always earn a positive profit (revenue share) from each successful transaction, our
equilibrium results partially explain the increasing popularity of the capacity sharing platforms
in practice. Only if f is sufficiently small and m is sufficiently large, the carriers who purchase
capacity from the platform in period 1 will eliminate their logistics capability, and will purchase
capacity again from the platform in period 2 (see Figures 5(b) and 6(b)).
We investigate which business model is more profitable for the consolidator. In general, the
UCC is more profitable than the platform if the carriers’ fixed delivery cost c is large. If c is
large, the carriers are more likely to outsource their delivery service, leading to a low supply
of capacity on the platform. Thus, there will not be sufficiently many successful transactions
on the platform, causing it to be less profitable than the UCC. Moreover, it is easier for the
UCC to dominate as the number of carriers n becomes larger because of her economy of scale
in shipment consolidation. However, there is an exception if f is sufficiently large and m is
intermediate (Region (ii) of §6.1). In this situation, the platform outperforms the UCC if the
discount factor δ is small. Since the carriers are less sensitive to their costs in period 2, they
become more likely to do their own delivery (and sell their remaining capacity to the platform).
This mitigates the imbalance of supply and demand on the platform, and makes the platform
more profitable than the UCC.
We also determine which business model is more efficient for reducing the social-environmental
cost. Although additional trucks are required by the UCC model, each truck of the UCC can
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potentially consolidate multiple carriers’ tasks. In contrast, no additional trucks are required by
the platform model, but each carrier on the platform can only serve at most one other carrier
because of his limited capacity. We find that if n is large, then the UCC is more efficient in
reducing the expected social-environmental cost than the platform. This is because the UCC’s
trucks (each can serve multiple tasks) can achieve a larger economy of scale in shipment con-
solidation when n is large. This significantly reduces the traffic congestion and pollution of the
last-mile delivery. Note that this is non-trivial because we have observed that the threshold of
n for the UCC to outperform the platform varies with the probability λ of a low task volume
in different manners under different situations (see Figure 7).
We study two extensions of our models. The first extension considers a hybrid model in which
the consolidator concurrently operates a UCC and a platform. We also analyze an extension
with correlated demands between two periods for each carrier. Other future research directions
include endogenizing the government subsidy S and considering the construction costs of the
UCC and the platform.
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A Online supplement
Proof of Lemma 1. By solving φ¯i2(0; d¯i1, p¯2) ≤ φ¯i2(−1; d¯i1, p¯2) for vi2, we obtain that
1. p¯2 ≤ m+ cvi2 if d¯i1 = −1 or 1. Thus, d¯∗i2 = 0 if p¯2 ≤ m+ cvi2 , and d¯∗i2 = −1 otherwise.
2. p¯2 ≤ m+ c+fvi2 if d¯i1 = 0. Thus, d¯∗i2 = 0 if p¯2 ≤ m+
c+f
vi2
, and d¯∗i2 = −1 otherwise.
Proof of Lemma 2. Define b1 = M − S + (
√
ne−
√
λne)C+
(
λ
(
1− vLvH
)
−(1−λ)
)
(c+f)ne
(1−λ)nevH ,
b2 = M−S+
(√
λ(n−ne)+ne−
√
λne
)
C+λnef−
(
(1−λ)ne vHvL +λ(n−ne)
)
c
(1−λ)nevH+λ(n−ne)vL , b3 = M−S+
(
√
n−√λne)C+λ(c+f)ne−
(
λ
vL
vH
+(1−λ)
)
cn
(1−λ)nvH+λ(n−ne)vL ,
b4 = M − S +
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λ(n−ne)+ne−√ne
)
C+
(
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+(1−λ)
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To derive V2 and n2 in the UCC’s expected profit function in Equation (1), we need to distinguish
the following four types of carriers:
Type 1 (d¯i1 = −1 or 1, and vi2 = vL): Each carrier i of this type uses the UCC’s service and eliminates
his logistics capability in period 2 (d¯∗i2 = 0) if p¯2 ≤ m + cvL . The expected number of carriers of this
type is λ(n−ne), and if those carriers use the UCC’s service in period 2, then the expected task volumes
served by the UCC are λ(n− ne)vL.
Type 2 (d¯i1 = −1 or 1, and vi2 = vH): Each carrier i of this type uses the UCC’s service and eliminates
his logistics capability in period 2 (d¯∗i2 = 0) if p¯2 ≤ m + cvH . The expected number of carriers of this
type is (1 − λ)(n − ne), and if those carriers use the UCC’s service in period 2, then the expected task
volumes served by the UCC in period 2 are (1− λ)(n− ne)vH .
Type 3 (d¯i1 = 0, and vi2 = vL): Each carrier i of this type uses the UCC’s service in period 2 (d¯
∗
i2 = 0)
if p¯2 ≤ m+ c+fvL . The expected number of carriers of this type is λne, and if those carriers use the UCC’s
service in period 2, then the expected task volumes served by the UCC in period 2 are λnevL.
Type 4 (d¯i1 = 0, and vi2 = vH): Each carrier i of this type uses the UCC’s service in period 2 (d¯
∗
i2 = 0)
if p¯2 ≤ m+ c+fvH . The expected number of carriers of this type is (1− λ)ne, and if those carriers use the
UCC’s service in period 2, then the expected task volumes served by the UCC in period 2 are (1−λ)nevH .
Note that the expected number of Type 3 and Type 4 carriers will be 0 if ne = 0. We first analyze
the UCC’s optimal decision in the case that ne > 0, before we analyze the case that ne = 0. According
to the assumption f > c(vH−vL)vL , we can derive m+
c+f
vL
> m+ c+fvH > m+
c
vL
> m+ cvH , so the optimal
choice of the UCC is among the following four:
1. Choose a price p¯2 ∈
(
m+ c+fvH ,m+
c+f
vL
]
to attract type 3 carriers only, then n2 and V2 equal to
the expected number and expected task volumes of type 3 carriers, that is n2 = λne and V2 = λnevL.
Substituting them into Equation (1), the UCC’s expected profit is
p¯i2(p¯2) = (p¯2 + S −M)λnevL −
√
λneC, (5)
which increases in p¯2, so it is optimal for the UCC to choose p¯
∗
2 = m+
c+f
vL
to maximize profit. Substituting
p¯∗2 = m+
c+f
vL
into Equation (5), we obtain that p¯i2
(
m+ c+fvL
)
=
(
m+ c+fvL + S −M
)
λnevL−
√
λneC.
2. Choose a price p¯2 ∈
(
m+ cvL ,m+
c+f
vH
]
to attract type 3 and type 4 carriers, then n2 and V2 equal
to the total expected number and expected task volumes of those carriers, that is n2 = λne + (1− λ)ne
and V2 = λnevL + (1− λ)nevH . Substituting them into Equation (1), the UCC’s expected profit is
p¯i2(p¯2) = (p¯2 + S −M)(λnevL + (1− λ)nevH)−
√
λne + (1− λ)neC, (6)
which increases in p¯2, so it is optimal for the UCC to choose p¯
∗
2 = m+
c+f
vH
to maximize profit. Substituting
p¯∗2 = m +
c+f
vH
into Equation (6), we obtain that p¯i2
(
m+ c+fvH
)
=
(
m+ c+fvH + S −M
)
(λnevL + (1 −
λ)nevH)−√neC.
3. Choose a price p¯2 ∈
(
m+ cvH ,m+
c
vL
]
to attract type 3, type 4, and type 1 carriers, then
n2 and V2 equal to the total expected number and expected task volumes of those carriers, that is
n2 = λne + (1− λ)ne + λ(n− ne) and V2 = λnevL + (1− λ)nevH + λ(n− ne)vL. Substituting them into
Equation (1), the UCC’s expected profit is
p¯i2(p¯2) = (p¯2 + S −M)(λnevL + (1− λ)nevH + λ(n− ne)vL)−
√
λne + (1− λ)ne + λ(n− ne)C, (7)
which increases in p¯2, so it is optimal for the UCC to choose p¯
∗
2 = m+
c
vL
to maximize profit. Substituting
p¯∗2 = m+
c
vL
into Equation (7), we obtain that p¯i2
(
m+ cvL
)
=
(
m+ cvL + S −M
)
(λnvL+(1−λ)nevH)−
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√
λ(n− ne) + neC.
4. Choose a price p¯2 ∈
(
0,m+ cvH
]
to attract all types of carriers, then n2 = n and V2 equals to the
total expected task volumes of all the carriers, that is V2 = λnevL + (1− λ)nevH + λ(n− ne)vL + (1−
λ)(n− ne)vH = λnvL + (1− λ)nvH . Substituting them into Equation (1), the UCC’s expected profit is
p¯i2(p¯2) = (p¯2 + S −M)(λnvL + (1− λ)nvH)−
√
nC, (8)
which increases in p¯2, so it is optimal for the UCC to choose p¯
∗
2 = m+
c
vH
to maximize profit. Substituting
p¯∗2 = m+
c
vH
into Equation (8), we obtain that p¯i2
(
m+ cvH
)
=
(
m+ cvH + S −M
)
(λnvL+(1−λ)nvH)−√
nC.
By comparing the profits of the UCC under choices 1, 2, 3, and 4, we can obtain that p¯i2
(
m+ c+fvL
)
is the maximum if m < min{b1, b2, b3}; p¯i2
(
m+ c+fvH
)
is the maximum if b1 ≤ m < min{b4, b5};
p¯i2
(
m+ cvL
)
is the maximum if max{b2, b4} ≤ m < b6; and p¯i2
(
m+ cvH
)
is the maximum if m ≥
max{b3, b5, b6}. Therefore, the corresponding prices p¯∗2 under those choices are optimal for the UCC, and
the results in Lemma 2 follow.
Similarly, we analyze the case that ne = 0. Since there is only type 1 and type 2 carriers, the optimal
decision of the UCC is among the following two:
1. Choose a price p¯2 ∈
(
m+ cvH ,m+
c
vL
]
to attract type 1 carriers only, then n2 and V2 equal to
the expected number and expected task volumes of type 1 carriers, that is n2 = λ(n − ne) = λn and
V2 = λ(n− ne)vL = λnvL. Substituting them into Equation (1), the UCC’s expected profit is
p¯i2(p¯2) = (p¯2 + S −M)λnvL −
√
λnC, (9)
which increases in p¯2, so it is optimal for the UCC to choose p¯
∗
2 = m+
c
vL
to maximize profit. Substituting
p¯∗2 = m+
c
vL
into Equation (9), we obtain that p¯i2
(
m+ cvL
)
=
(
m+ cvL + S −M
)
λnvL −
√
λnC.
2. Choose a price p¯2 ∈
(
0,m+ cvH
]
to attract both types of carriers, then n2 = n and V2 equals
to the total expected task volumes of all the carriers, that is V2 = λ(n − ne)vL + (1 − λ)(n − ne)vH =
λnvL + (1− λ)nvH . Substituting them into Equation (1), the UCC’s expected profit is
p¯i2(p¯2) = (p¯2 + S −M)(λnvL + (1− λ)nvH)−
√
nC, (10)
which increases in p¯2, so it is optimal for the UCC to choose p¯
∗
2 = m+
c
vH
to maximize profit. Substituting
p¯∗2 = m +
c
vH
into Equation (10), we obtain that p¯i2
(
m+ cvH
)
=
(
m+ cvH + S −M
)
(λnvL + (1 −
λ)nvH)−
√
nC.
By comparing the profits of the UCC under choices 1 and 2, we can obtain that p¯i2
(
m+ cvL
)
>
p¯i2
(
m+ cvH
)
if m < b7. Therefore, it is optimal for the UCC to choose p¯
∗
2 = m +
c
vL
if m < b7, and
p¯∗2 = m+
c
vH
otherwise. The results in Lemma 2 thus follow.
Proof of Lemma 3. Define b˜1 = M − S + (
√
n˜e−
√
λn˜e)C+
(
λ
(
1− vLvH
)
−(1−λ)
)
(c+f)n˜e
(1−λ)n˜evH ,
b˜2 = M−S+
(√
λ(n−n˜e)+n˜e−
√
λn˜e
)
C+λn˜ef−
(
(1−λ)n˜e vHvL +λ(n−n˜e)
)
c
(1−λ)n˜evH+λ(n−n˜e)vL , b˜3 = M−S+
(
√
n−√λn˜e)C+λ(c+f)n˜e−
(
λ
vL
vH
+(1−λ)
)
cn
(1−λ)nvH+λ(n−n˜e)vL ,
b˜4 = M − S +
(√
λ(n−n˜e)+n˜e−
√
n˜e
)
C+
(
λ
vL
vH
+(1−λ)
)
(c+f)n˜e
λ(n−n˜e)vL −
(
λn+(1−λ)n˜e vHvL
)
c
λ(n−n˜e)vL ,
b˜5 = M − S + (
√
n−√n˜e)C+
(
λ
vL
vH
+(1−λ)
)
(c+f)n˜e−
(
λ
vL
vH
+(1−λ)
)
cn
λ(n−n˜e)vL+(1−λ)(n−n˜e)vH ,
and b˜6 = M − S +
(√
n−
√
λ(n−n˜e)+n˜e
)
C−
(
λn
(
1− vLvH
)
+(1−λ)n˜e vHvL −(1−λ)n
)
c
(1−λ)(n−n˜e)vH .
We first determine a carrier’s optimal decision when n˜e > 0. Note that n˜e is rational and hence is
equal, in equilibrium, to the corresponding actual value ne. Thus, according to case 1(a) of Lemma 2, if
m < min
{
b˜1, b˜2, b˜3
}
, then p¯∗2 = m +
c+f
vL
. Given p¯∗2, each carrier i minimizes his total discounted cost
Φ¯i(d¯i1; p¯1) by comparing the following 3 options:
1. d¯i1 = −1: In this case, according to Lemmas 1 and 2, carrier i will deliver on his own in period
2. This incurs an expected cost Φ¯i(−1; p¯1) = c+mvi1 + δ(λ(c+mvL) + (1− λ)(c+mvH)).
2. d¯i1 = 0: In this case, according to Lemmas 1 and 2, carrier i will use the UCC’s service in period 2
if vi2 = vL and deliver on his own otherwise. This incurs an expected cost Φ¯i(0; p¯1) = p¯1vi1 + δ(λp¯
∗
2vL +
(1− λ)(c+mvH + f)) = p¯1vi1 + δ(λ(c+mvL) + (1− λ)(c+mvH) + f).
3. d¯i1 = 1: In this case, according to Lemmas 1 and 2, carrier i will deliver on his own in period 2.
This incurs an expected cost Φ¯i(1; p¯1) = p¯1vi1 + h+ δ(λ(c+mvL) + (1− λ)(c+mvH)).
By comparing the above three options, we obtain that d¯∗i1 = 1 if p¯1 ≤ m+ c−hvi1 , and d¯∗i1 = −1 otherwise.
This proves case 1(a) of Lemma 3. Next we determine the carrier’s optimal decision in case 1(b) of
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Lemma 3. Similarly, according to case 1 of Lemma 2, if b˜1 ≤ m < min
{
b˜4, b˜5
}
, then p¯∗2 = m +
c+f
vH
.
Given p¯∗2, each carrier i minimizes his total discounted cost Φ¯i(d¯i1; p¯1) by comparing the following three
options:
1. d¯i1 = −1: In this case, according to Lemmas 1 and 2, carrier i will deliver on his own in period 2.
This incurs an expected cost Φ¯i(−1; p¯1) = c+mvi1 + δ(λ(c+mvL) + (1− λ)(c+mvH)).
2. d¯i1 = 0: In this case, according to Lemmas 1 and 2, carrier i will use the UCC’s service in period 2. This
incurs an expected cost Φ¯i(0; p¯1) = p¯1vi1+δ(λp¯
∗
2vL+(1−λ)p¯∗2vH) = p¯1vi1+δ
(
m+ c+fvH
)
(λvL+(1−λ)vH).
3. d¯i1 = 1: In this case, according to Lemmas 1 and 2, carrier i will deliver on his own in period 2. This
incurs an expected cost Φ¯i(1; p¯1) = p¯1vi1 + h+ δ(λ(c+mvL) + (1− λ)(c+mvH)).
By comparing the above three options, we obtain that d¯∗i1 = 1 if p¯1 ≤ m + c−hvi1 and h ≤ δ(c +
f)
(
λ vLvH + 1− λ
)
−δc, d¯∗i1 = 0 if p¯1 ≤ m+ (1+δ)cvi1 −
δ(c+f)
(
λ
vL
vH
+1−λ
)
vi1
and h > δ(c+f)
(
λ vLvH + 1− λ
)
−δc,
and d¯∗i1 = −1 otherwise. This proves case 1(b) of Lemma 3. The proofs of cases 1(c) and 2(a) are similar
to the proof of case 1(b), and the proofs of cases 1(d) and 2(b) are similar to the proof of case 1(a), and
thus omitted.
Proof of Theorem 1. Define m1 = M − S + (
√
n−√λn)C+
(
λ
(
1− vLvH
)
−(1−λ)
)
n(c−h)
(1−λ)nvH ,
m2 = M−S+
(1−λ)√nC+λ2nf−
(
λ
vL
vH
+(1−λ)2
)
nc
(1−λ)nvH+λ(1−2λ)nvL , m3 = M−S+
(
√
n−√λn)C+
(
λ
vL
vH
+1−λ
)
(c+f)λn−
(
λ
vL
vH
+1−λ
)
nc
(1−λ)(λnvL+(1−λ)nvH) ,
and m4 = M − S +
(√
n−
√
λ(1−λ)n+λn
)
C+
(
λ
(
1− vLvH
)
−(1−λ)
(
1−λ vHvL
))
nc
(1−λ)2nvH .
The UCC’s expected profit Π¯(p¯1) in Equation (2) depends on V1 and n1. The different cases in
Lemma 3 corresponding to different decisions of each carrier will lead to different values of V1 and n1. In
the following, we analyze each case of Lemma 3 to derive V1 and n1 and obtain the UCC’s expected total
discounted profit and then determine the equilibrium price. To derive V1 and n1, we need to distinguish
the following two typs of carriers:
Type A (vi1 = vL): The expected number of carriers of this type is λn.
Type B (vi1 = vH): The expected number of carriers of this type is (1− λ)n.
We first analyze the cases that n˜e > 0 of Lemma 3, that is cases 1(a), 1(b), 1(c), and 1(d). Note that n˜e is
rational and hence equal to to the corresponding actual value in equilibrium, and thus n˜e = ne(p¯
∗
1, p¯
∗
2) > 0,
b˜1 = b1, b˜2 = b2, b˜3 = b3, b˜4 = b4, b˜5 = b5, and b˜6 = b6.
In case 1(a) (n˜e > 0 and m < min
{
b˜1, b˜2, b˜3
}
), d¯∗i1 = 1 if p¯1 ≤ m + c−hvi1 , or d¯∗i1 = −1 otherwise.
Thus, type A carriers use the UCC’s service and keep their logistics capability if p¯1 ≤ m + c−hvL , and
type B carriers use the UCC’s service and keep their logistics capability if p¯1 ≤ m + c−hvH . In this case,
no carrier will use the UCC’s service and eliminate logistics capability, which means ne = 0, and thus
cannot happen in equilibrium.
In cases 1(b) (n˜e > 0 and b˜1 ≤ m < min
{
b˜4, b˜5
}
) and 1(c) (n˜e > 0 and max
{
b˜2, b˜4
}
≤ m < b˜6),
since we focus on the case that h ≤ min
{
δ(c + f)
(
λ vLvH + 1− λ
)
− δc, δc
(
λ+ (1− λ)vHvL
)
− δc
}
, thus
d¯∗i1 = 1 if p¯1 ≤ m + c−hvi1 , or d¯∗i1 = −1 otherwise. Similar to the above case 1(a), these cases will never
happen in equilibrium.
In case 1(d) (n˜e > 0 and m ≥ max
{
b˜3, b˜5, b˜6
}
), d¯∗i1 = 0 if p¯1 ≤ m + cvi1 , or d¯∗i1 = −1 otherwise.
Thus, type A carriers use the UCC’s service and eliminate their logistics capability if p¯1 ≤ m+ cvL , and
type B carriers use the UCC’s service and eliminate their logistics capability if p¯1 ≤ m + cvH . In case
1(d), we have obtained that p¯∗2 = m +
c
vH
according to Lemma 2. The optimal choice of the retailer in
period 1 is among the following two:
1. Choose a price p¯1 ∈
(
m+ cvH ,m+
c
vL
]
to attract type A carriers only, then n1 and V1 equal to
the expected number and task volumes of type A carriers, that is n1 = λn and V1 = λnvL. Since type A
carriers use the UCC’s service and eliminate their logistics capability, thus ne = n1 = λn. Substituting
them into Equation (2), the UCC’s expeted total discounted profit is
Π¯(p¯1) = (p¯1 + S −M)λnvL −
√
λnC + δp¯i2
(
m+ cvH
)
= (p¯1 + S −M)λnvL −
√
λnC + δ
[(
m+ cvH + S −M
)
(λnvL + (1− λ)nvH)−
√
nC
]
,
(11)
which increases in p¯1, so it is optimal for the UCC to choose p¯
∗
1 = m +
c
vL
to maximize profit. This
could be in equilirbium only if ne = λn satisfies the conditions that ne > 0 (which is satisfied) and
m ≥ max{b3, b5, b6}. Substituting ne = λn into b3, b5, and b6, we can rewrite the latter conition as
m ≥ max{m2,m3,m4}. This leads to the results in case 3 of Theorem 1.
2. Choose a price p¯1 ∈
(
0,m+ cvH
]
to attract both types of carriers, then n1 = n and V1 equals to
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the total expected task volumes of all the carriers, that is V1 = λnvL + (1−λ)nvH . Since all the carriers
use the UCC’s service and eliminate their logistics capability, thus ne = n1 = n. Substituting them into
Equation (2), the UCC’s expeted total discounted profit is
Π¯(p¯1) = (p¯1 + S −M)(λnvL + (1− λ)nvH)−
√
nC + δp¯i2
(
m+ cvH
)
= (p¯1 + S −M)(λnvL + (1− λ)nvH)−
√
nC + δ
[(
m+ cvH + S −M
)
(λnvL + (1− λ)nvH)−
√
nC
]
,
(12)
which increases in p¯1, so it is optimal for the UCC to choose p¯
∗
1 = m +
c
vH
to maximize profit. This
could be in equilirbium only if ne = n satisfies the conditions that ne > 0 (which is satisfied) and
m ≥ max{b3, b5, b6}. Substituting ne = n into b3, b5, and b6, we find that the latter condition can never
be satisfied as b5 and b6 go to infinity.
Next we analyze the cases that n˜e = 0 of Lemma 3, that is cases 2(a) and 2(b). Similarly, since n˜e is
rational and hence equal to the corresponding actual value in equilibrium, and thus ne(p¯
∗
1, p¯
∗
2) = n˜e = 0.
In case 2(a) (n˜e = 0 and m < b7, since we focus on the case that h ≤ min
{
δ(c+ f)
(
λ vLvH + 1− λ
)
−
δc, δc
(
λ+ (1− λ)vHvL
)
− δc
}
, thus d¯∗i1 = 1 if p¯1 ≤ m+ c−hvi1 , or d¯∗i1 = −1 otherwise. Thus, type A carriers
use the UCC’s service and keep their logistics capability if p¯1 ≤ m + c−hvL , and type B carriers use the
UCC’s service and eliminate their logistics capability if p¯1 ≤ m + c−hvH . In case 2(a), we have obtained
that p¯∗2 = m +
c
vL
according to Lemma 2. The optimal choice of the retailer in period 1 is among the
following two:
1. Choose a price p¯1 ∈
(
m+ c−hvH ,m+
c−h
vL
]
to attract type A carriers only, then n1 and V1 equal
to the expected number and task volumes of type A carriers, that is n1 = λn and V1 = λnvL. Since
no carrier will use the UCC’s service and keeplogistics capability, thus ne = 0. Substituting them into
Equation (2), the UCC’s expeted total discounted profit is
Π¯(p¯1) = (p¯1 + S −M)λnvL −
√
λnC + δp¯i2
(
m+ cvL
)
= (p¯1 + S −M)λnvL −
√
λnC + δ
[(
m+ cvL + S −M
)
λnvL −
√
λnC
]
,
(13)
which increases in p¯1, so it is optimal for the UCC to choose p¯
∗
1 = m +
c−h
vL
to maximize profit. This
could be in equilirbium only if ne = 0 satisfies the conditions that ne = 0 (which is satisfied) and
m− (M − S) < m1. Substituting p¯∗1 = m+ c−hvL into Equation (13), we can obtain that Π¯
(
m+ c−hvL
)
=
(1 + δ)(m+ S −M)λnvL + ((1 + δ)c− h)λn− (1 + δ)
√
λnC.
2. Choose a price p¯1 ∈
(
0,m+ c−hvH
]
to attract both types of carriers, then n1 = n and V1 equals to
the total expected task volumes of all the carriers, that is V1 = λnvL + (1− λ)nvH . Since no carrier will
use the UCC’s service and eliminate logistics capability, thus ne = 0. Substituting them into Equation
(2), the UCC’s expeted total discounted profit is
Π¯(p¯1) = (p¯1 + S −M)(λnvL + (1− λ)nvH)−
√
nC + δp¯i2
(
m+ cvL
)
= (p¯1 + S −M)(λnvL + (1− λ)nvH)−
√
nC + δ
[(
m+ cvL + S −M
)
λnvL −
√
λnC
]
,
(14)
which increases in p¯1, so it is optimal for the UCC to choose p¯
∗
1 = m +
c−h
vH
to maximize profit. This
could be in equilirbium only if ne = 0 satisfies the conditions that ne = 0 (which is satisfied) and m < b7.
Substituting p¯∗1 = m +
c−h
vH
into Equation (14), we can obtain that Π¯
(
m+ c−hvH
)
= (m + S −M)((1 +
δ)λnvL + (1− λ)nvH) + δλcn+ (c− h)n
(
λ vLvH + 1− λ
)
−
(√
n+ δ
√
λn
)
C.
By comparing Π¯
(
m+ c−hvL
)
and Π¯
(
m+ c−hvH
)
with respect to m, we obtain that Π¯
(
m+ c−hvL
)
>
Π¯
(
m+ c−hvH
)
if m < m1. Therefore, we have p¯
∗
1 = m +
c−h
vL
if m < min{b7,m1}, and p¯∗1 = m + c−hvH if
min{b7,m1} ≤ m < b7. This leads to the results in cases 1 and 2 of Theorem 1.
In case 2(b) (n˜e = 0 and m− (M − S) ≥ b7), d¯∗i1 = 0 if p¯1 ≤ m+ cvi1 , or d¯∗i1 = −1 otherwise. Thus,
type A carriers use the UCC’s service and eliminate their logistics capability if p¯1 ≤ m + cvL , and type
B carriers use the UCC’s service and eliminate their logistics capability if p¯1 ≤ m + cvH . In this case,
ne = 0 will never happen which indicates that it will never be in equilibrium.
Lemma 4. (Optimal decision of carrier i ∈ NL,2 in period 2)
1. If dˆi1 = −1 or 1, then in period 2 carrier i purchases capacity from the platform and eliminates his
logistics capability (dˆ∗i2 = 0) if pˆ2 <
c+(1+θ2)mvL
[1+θ2(1−α)]vL , or delivers on his own (dˆ
∗
i2 = −1) if pˆ2 > c+(1+θ2)mvL[1+θ2(1−α)]vL .
2. If dˆi1 = 0, then in period 2, carrier i purchases capacity from the platform (dˆ
∗
i2 = 0) if pˆ2 <
c+f+(1+θ2)mvL
[1+θ2(1−α)]vL , or delivers on his own (dˆ
∗
i2 = −1) if pˆ2 > c+f+(1+θ2)mvL[1+θ2(1−α)]vL .
35
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3509019 
Proof of Lemma 4. By solving φˆi2(0; dˆi1, pˆ2) ≤ φˆi2(−1; dˆ|i1, pˆ2) for vi2, we obtain that
1. pˆ2 < (c + 2mvL)/((2 − α)vL) if dˆi1 = −1 or 1. Thus, dˆ∗i2 = 0 if pˆ2 < (c + 2mvL)/((2 − α)vL), and
dˆ∗i2 = −1 if pˆ2 > (c+ 2mvL)/((2− α)vL).
2. pˆ2 < (c + 2mvL + f)/((2 − α)vL) if dˆi1 = 0. Thus, dˆ∗i2 = 0 if pˆ2 < (c + 2mvL + f)/((2 − α)vL), and
dˆ∗i2 = −1 if pˆ2 > (c+ 2mvL + f)/((2− α)vL).
Lemma 5. (Optimal decision of the platform in period 2) Define ne as the number of carriers
who purchase capacity on the platform and elimate their logistics capability in period 1.
1. If ne > n/2, the optimal price of the platform in period 2 is as follows. If (c + f)[2(n − ne)(2n −
αne)− (2− α)(2n− ne)ne] ≤ 2mvL[(2− α)nne − 2(n− ne)(2n− αne)], then pˆ∗2 = (2n−ne)(c+f)+2nmvL(2n−αne)vL ;
if (c + f)[2(n − ne)(2n − αne) − (2 − α)(2n − ne)ne] > 2mvL[(2 − α)nne − 2(n − ne)(2n − αne)], then
pˆ∗2 =
c+2mvL+f
(2−α)vL − .
2. If ne ≤ n/2, the optimal price of the UCC’s service in period 2 is as follows. If (c + f)[2(n −
ne)(2n − αne) − (n − αne)(2n − ne)] ≤ 2mvL[n(n − αne) − n(2n − αne)] and (c + f)(2 − α)(2n −
ne)ne− (2n−αne)(n−ne)c > 2mvL[(2n−αne)(n−ne)− (2−α)nne], then pˆ∗2 = (2n−ne)(c+f)+2nmvL(2n−αne)vL ; if
(c+f)[2(n−ne)(2n−αne)−(n−αne)(2n−ne)] > 2mvL[n(n−αne)−n(2n−αne)] and 2(c+f)(2−α)(n−
ne)ne − (n−αne)(n− ne)c > 2mvL[(n−αne)(n− ne)− (2−α)nne], then pˆ∗2 = (c+f)(n−ne)+nmvL(n−αne)vL − ; if
2(c+ f)(2−α)(n− ne)ne− (n−αne)(n− ne)c ≤ 2mvL[(n−αne)(n− ne)− (2−α)nne] and (c+ f)(2−
α)(2n− ne)ne − (2n− αne)(n− ne)c ≤ 2mvL[(2n− αne)(n− ne)− (2− α)nne], then pˆ∗2 = c+2mvL(2−α)vL .
Proof of Lemma 5. To derive ns,2 and np,2 in the platform’s expected profit function in Equation (3),
we need to distinguish the following two types of carriers:
Type 1 (dˆi1 = −1 or 1): Each carrier i of this type purchases capacity from the platform and eliminates
his logistics capability in period 2 (dˆ∗i2 = 0) if pˆ2 <
c+2mvL
(2−α)vL , or delivers on his own and sell capacity on
the platform (dˆ∗i2 = 1) if pˆ2 >
c+2mvL
(2−α)vL , or chooses either option with same probability if pˆ2 =
c+2mvL
(2−α)vL .
The expected number of carriers of this type is λ(λn− ne) + λ(1− λ)n.
Type 2 (dˆi1 = 0): Each carrier i of this type purchases capacity from the platform and eliminates his
logistics capability in period 2 (dˆ∗i2 = 0) if pˆ2 <
c+2mvL+f
(2−α)vL , or delivers on his own and sell capacity on the
platform (dˆ∗i2 = 1) if pˆ2 >
c+2mvL+f
(2−α)vL , or chooses either option with same probability if pˆ2 =
c+2mvL+f
(2−α)vL .
The expected number of carriers of this type is λne.
To maximize her profit, the optimal choice of the platform is among the following three:
1. Choose a price pˆ2 =
c+2mvL+f
(2−α)vL to incentivize type 1 carriers to sell capacity, and type 2 carriers to
purchase or sell capacity with same probability. Then we can obtain that ns,2 = λ(λn − ne) + λ(1 −
λ)n+ λne/2 , and np,2 = λne/2. Substituting them into Equation (3), the platform’s expected profit is
pˆi2
(
c+2mvL+f
(2−α)vL
)
= α c+2mvL+f(2−α)vL min{[λ(λn− ne) + λ(1− λ)n+ λne/2]vL, λnevL/2}
= λα(c+2mvL+f)2−α min{n− ne/2, ne/2}
= λα(c+2mvL+f)ne2(2−α) .
2. Choose a price pˆ2 =
c+2mvL+f
(2−α)vL −  to incentivize type 1 carriers to sell capacity, and type 2 carriers
to purchase capacity from the platform. Then we can obtain that ns,2 = λ(λn − ne) + λ(1 − λ)n , and
np,2 = λne. Substituting them into Equation (3), the platform’s expected profit is
pˆi2
(
c+2mvL+f
(2−α)vL − 
)
= α( c+2mvL+f(2−α)vL − ) min{[λ(λn− ne) + λ(1− λ)n]vL, λnevL}
= λα(c+2mvL+f)2−α min{ne, n− ne} − 
=
{
λα(c+2mvL+f)ne
2−α − , if ne < n/2;
λα(c+2mvL+f)(n−ne)
2−α − , if ne ≥ n/2.
3. Choose a price pˆ2 =
c+2mvL
(2−α)vL to incentivize type 1 carriers to sell or purchase capacity with same
probability, and type 2 carriers to purchase capacity from the platform. Then we can obtain that
ns,2 = [λ(λn−ne) + λ(1− λ)n]/2 , and np,2 = [λ(λn−ne) + λ(1− λ)n]/2 + λne. Substituting them into
Equation (3), the platform’s expected profit is
pˆi2
(
c+2mvL
(2−α)vL
)
= α c+2mvL(2−α)vL min{[λ(λn− ne) + λ(1− λ)n]vL/2, λnevL}
= λα(c+2mvL)2−α min{(n− ne)/2, (n+ ne)/2}
= λα(c+2mvL)(n−ne)2(2−α) .
By comparing the profits of the platform under choices 1, 2 and 3, we can obtain that pˆi2
(
c+2mvL+f
(2−α)vL
)
is
the maximum if ne ≥ 2n3 ; pˆi2
(
c+2mvL+f
(2−α)vL − 
)
is the maximum if (c+2mvL)n2(c+2mvL)+f ≤ ne < 2n3 ; and pˆi2
(
c+2mvL
(2−α)vL
)
is the maximum if ne <
(c+2mvL)n
2(c+2mvL)+f
. Therefore, the results in Lemma 5 follow.
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Lemma 6. (Optimal decision of carrier i in period 1) Assume all carriers and the capacity sharing
platform have a common rational belief n˜e about ne.
1. If n˜e > n/2; or n˜e ≤ n/2, (c+f)[2(n−ne)(2n−αne)−(2−α)(2n−ne)ne] ≤ 2mvL[(2−α)nne−2(n−
ne)(2n−αne)], and (c+f)(2−α)(2n−ne)ne−(2n−αne)(n−ne)c > 2mvL[(2n−αne)(n−ne)−(2−α)nne];
or n˜e ≤ n/2, (c+f)[2(n−ne)(2n−αne)− (2−α)(2n−ne)ne] > 2mvL[(2−α)nne−2(n−ne)(2n−αne)],
and 2(c+ f)(2−α)(n−ne)ne− (n−αne)(n−ne)c > 2mvL[(n−αne)(n−ne)− (2−α)nne], the optimal
decisions of carrier i are as follows. If pˆ1 <
c+2mvL−h
(2−α)vL , then dˆ
∗
i1 = 1; if pˆ1 >
c+2mvL−h
(2−α)vL , then dˆ
∗
i1 = −1;
if pˆ1 =
c+2mvL−h
(2−α)vL , then dˆ
∗
i1 = 1 or −1 with an equal probability.
2. If n˜e ≤ n/2, 2(c+ f)(2−α)(n−ne)ne− (n−αne)(n−ne)c ≤ 2mvL[(n−αne)(n−ne)− (2−α)nne],
and (c + f)(2 − α)(2n − ne)ne − (2n − αne)(n − ne)c ≤ 2mvL[(2n − αne)(n − ne) − (2 − α)nne], the
optimal decisions of carrier i are as follows.
(a) If h ≤ δ(1 − λ)f , then if pˆ1 < c+2mvL−h(2−α)vL , dˆ∗i1 = 1; if pˆ1 > c+2mvL−h(2−α)vL , dˆ∗i1 = −1; if pˆ1 = c+2mvL−h(2−α)vL ,
dˆ∗i1 = 1 or −1 with an equal probability.
(b) If h > δ(1 − λ)f , then if pˆ1 < c+2mvL−δ(1−λ)f(2−α)vL , dˆ∗i1 = 0; if pˆ1 >
c+2mvL−δ(1−λ)f
(2−α)vL , dˆ
∗
i1 = −1; if
pˆ1 =
c+2mvL−δ(1−λ)f
(2−α)vL , dˆ
∗
i1 = 0 or −1 with an equal probability.
Proof of Lemma 6. We first determine a carrier’s optimal decision when n˜e ≥ 2n3 . Note that n˜e is rational
and hence is equal, in equilibrium, to the corresponding actual value ne. Thus, according to Lemma 5,
if n˜e = ne ≥ 2n3 , then pˆ∗2 = c+2mvL+f(2−α)vL . Each carrier i minimizes his total discounted cost Φˆi1(dˆi1; pˆ1, pˆ2)
by comparing the following three options:
1. dˆi1 = −1: In this case, according to Lemma 5, carrier i will deliver on his own and sell capacity in
period 2 (if he has low task volume in period 2, i.e., vi2 = vL). This incurs an expected total discounted
cost Φˆi1(−1; pˆ1, pˆ2) = c+mvL− [(1−α)pˆ1−m]vL+δ(λ(c+mvL− [(1−α)pˆ∗2−m]vL)+(1−λ)(c+mvH)).
2. dˆi1 = 0: In this case, according to Lemma 5, carrier i will purchase capacity from the platform or
deliver on his own and sell capacity in period 2 with same probability (if he has low task volume in period
2, i.e., vi2 = vL). This incurs an expected total discounted cost Φˆi1(0; pˆ1, pˆ2) = pˆ1vL + δ(λ(pˆ
∗
2vL/2 + (c+
mvL − [(1− α)pˆ∗2 −m]vL + f)/2) + (1− λ)(c+mvH)).
3. dˆi1 = 1: In this case, according to Lemma 5, carrier i will deliver on his own and sell capacity in
period 2 (if he has low task volume in period 2, i.e., vi2 = vL). This incurs an expected total discounted
cost Φˆi1(−1; pˆ1, pˆ2) = pˆ1vL + h+ δ(λ(c+mvL − [(1− α)pˆ∗2 −m]vL) + (1− λ)(c+mvH)).
By comparing the above three options, we obtain that, if h ≤ δλf , then dˆ∗i1 = 1 if pˆ1 < (c + 2mvL −
h)/((2 − α)vL), or dˆ∗i1 = −1 if pˆ1 > (c + 2mvL − h)/((2 − α)vL). If h > δλf , then dˆ∗i1 = 0 if pˆ1 <
(c+ 2mvL − δλf)/((2− α)vL), or dˆ∗i1 = −1 if pˆ1 > (c+ 2mvL − δλf)/((2− α)vL).
Next we determine the carrier’s optimal decision when (c+2mvL)n2(c+2mvL)+f ≤ n˜e < 2n3 . Similarly, ac-
cording to Lemma 5, pˆ∗2 =
c+2mvL+f
(2−α)vL − . Each carrier i minimizes his expected total discounted cost
Φˆi1(dˆi1; pˆ1, pˆ2) by comparing the following three options:
1. dˆi1 = −1: In this case, according to Lemma 5, carrier i will deliver on his own and sell capacity in
period 2 (if he has low task volume in period 2, i.e., vi2 = vL). This incurs an expected total discounted
cost Φˆi1(−1; pˆ1, pˆ2) = c+mvL− [(1−α)pˆ1−m]vL+δ(λ(c+mvL− [(1−α)pˆ∗2−m]vL)+(1−λ)(c+mvH)).
2. dˆi1 = 0: In this case, according to Lemma 5, carrier i will purchase capacity from the platform in
period 2 (if he has low task volume in period 2, i.e., vi2 = vL). This incurs an expected total discounted
cost Φˆi1(0; pˆ1, pˆ2) = pˆ1vL + δ(λpˆ
∗
2vL + (1− λ)(c+mvH)).
3. dˆi1 = 1: In this case, according to Lemma 5, carrier i will deliver on his own and sell capacity in
period 2 (if he has low task volume in period 2, i.e., vi2 = vL). This incurs an expected total discounted
cost Φˆi1(−1; pˆ1, pˆ2) = pˆ1vL + h+ δ(λ(c+mvL − [(1− α)pˆ∗2 −m]vL) + (1− λ)(c+mvH)).
By comparing the above three options, we obtain the same results as in the case that n˜e ≥ 2n3 . Thus,
the carrier’s optimal decision is same as in that case.
Finally, we determine the carrier’s optimal decision when n˜e <
(c+2mvL)n
2(c+2mvL)+f
. According to Lemma 5,
pˆ∗2 =
c+2mvL
(2−α)vL . Each carrier i minimizes his expected total discounted cost Φˆi1(dˆi1; pˆ1, pˆ2) by comparing
the following three options:
1. dˆi1 = −1: In this case, according to Lemma 5, carrier i will purchase capacity from the platform
or deliver on his own and sell capacity in period 2 with same probability (if he has low task volume in
period 2, i.e., vi2 = vL). This incurs an expected total discounted cost Φˆi1(−1; pˆ1, pˆ2) = c+mvL − [(1−
α)pˆ1 −m]vL + δ(λ(pˆ∗2vL/2 + (c+mvL − [(1− α)pˆ∗2 −m]vL)/2) + (1− λ)(c+mvH)).
2. dˆi1 = 0: In this case, according to Lemma 5, carrier i will purchase capacity from the platform in
period 2 (if he has low task volume in period 2, i.e., vi2 = vL). This incurs an expected total discounted
cost Φˆi1(0; pˆ1, pˆ2) = pˆ1vL + δ(λpˆ
∗
2vL + (1− λ)(c+mvH)).
3. dˆi1 = 1: In this case, according to Lemma 5, carrier i will purchase capacity from the platform or
deliver on his own and sell capacity in period 2 with same probability (if he has low task volume in
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period 2, i.e., vi2 = vL). This incurs an expected total discounted cost Φˆi1(−1; pˆ1, pˆ2) = pˆ1vL + h +
δ(λ(pˆ∗2vL/2 + (c+mvL − [(1− α)pˆ∗2 −m]vL)/2) + (1− λ)(c+mvH)).
By comparing the above three options, we obtain that, dˆ∗i1 = 0 if pˆ1 < (c + 2mvL)/((2 − α)vL), or
dˆ∗i1 = −1 if pˆ1 > (c + 2mvL)/((2 − α)vL). Combining the results in the above three cases together,
Lemma 6 follows.
Proof of Theorem 2. Similar to the proof of Theorem 1, we analyze each case of Lemma 6 to derive the
platform’s expected total discounted profit and determine the equilibrium price.
We can obtain that case 1 of Lemma 6 is not in equilibrium, because the conditions of this case
cannot be satisfied under any pˆ1. For case 2 of Lemma 6, according to Lemma 5, we have pˆ
∗
2 =
c+2mvL
(2−α)vL .
If h ≤ δ(1−λ)f , that is f ≥ hδ(1−λ) , then according to Lemma 6, each carrier purchases capacity from the
platform and keeps his logistics capability if pˆ1 <
c+2mvL−h
(2−α)vL , or delivers on his own and sell remaining
capacity if pˆ1 >
c+2mvL−h
(2−α)vL , or with same probability to choose either option if pˆ1 =
c+2mvL−h
(2−α)vL . It’s
optimal for the platform to choose pˆ∗1 =
c+2mvL−h
(2−α)vL to maximize her profit. This leads to ne = 0 = n˜e,
with which the conditions of case 2 are always satisified. This completes the proof of case 1 of Theorem
2.
If h > δ(1 − λ)f , that is f < hδ(1−λ) , according to Lemma 6, each carrier purchases capacity from
the platform and eliminates his logistics capability if pˆ1 <
c+2mvL−δ(1−λ)f
(2−α)vL or delivers on his own and
sell remaining capacity if pˆ1 >
c+2mvL−δ(1−λ)f
(2−α)vL , or with same probability to choose either option if
pˆ1 =
c+2mvL−δ(1−λ)f
(2−α)vL . It is optimal for the platform to choose pˆ1 =
c+2mvL−δ(1−λ)f
(2−α)vL to maximize her
profit. This leads to ne =
λ
2n = n˜e. Substituting them into the conditions of case 2, we obtain that
f <
(2−2λ+αλ24 )mvL+(1− 3λ2 +λ(λ+α)4 )c
(2−α)λ2 (1−λ4 )
and f <
(2−3λ+αλ22 )mvL+(1− 5λ2 +λ2+αλ(2−λ)4 )c
(2−α)λ2 (2−λ)
. Combining them with
the condition f < hδ(1−λ) , the result in case 2 of Theorem 2 follows.
Proof of Theorem 3. Define m5 =
(2−α)(1−λ4 )λh
2δ(1−λ) −(1− 3λ2 +λ(λ+α)4 )c(
2−2λ+αλ24
)
vL
, m6 =
(2−α)(2−λ)λh
2δ(1−λ) −(1− 5λ2 +λ2+αλ(2−λ)4 )c(
2−3λ+αλ22
)
vL
,
f1 =
[(1−λ)vH+λ(1−2λ)vL]
[(√
n−
√
λ(1−λ)n+λn
)
C+
(
λn
(
1− vLvH
)
−(1−λ)
(
1−λ vHvL
)
n
)
c
]
λ2(1−λ)2nvH +
(
λ
vL
vH
+(1−λ)2
)
nc−(1−λ)√nC
λ2n ,
f2 =
[(1−λ)vH+λvL]
[(√
n−
√
λ(1−λ)n+λn
)
C+
(
λn
(
1− vLvH
)
−(1−λ)
(
1−λ vHvL
)
n
)
c
]
λ(1−λ)nvH
(
λ
vL
vH
+1−λ
) + (1−λ)
(
λ
vL
vH
+1−λ
)
nc−(√n−
√
λn)C
λn
(
λ
vL
vH
+1−λ
) ,
f3 =
[m−(M−S)][(1−λ)nvH+λ(1−2λ)nvL]−(1−λ)√nC+
(
λ
vL
vH
+(1−λ)2
)
nc
λ2n , and
f4 =
[m−(M−S)](1−λ)(λnvL+(1−λ)nvH)−(√n−
√
λn)C+(1−λ)
(
λ
vL
vH
+1−λ
)
nc
λn
(
λ
vL
vH
+1−λ
) .
In Region (i), the equilibrium expected total discounted profits of the UCC and the platform are
Π¯(m+ cvL ) and Πˆ
(
c+2mvL−δ(1−λ)f
(2−α)vL
)
respectively. Substituting p¯∗1 and p¯
∗
2 into Equation (2), pˆ
∗
1 and pˆ
∗
2 into
Equation (4), we can obtain that Π¯
(
m+ cvL
)
= (1+δ)(m+S−M)λnvL+δ(1−λ)(m+S−M)nvH+λnc+
δnc
(
λ vLvH + 1− λ
)
−
(√
λn+ δ
√
n
)
C, and Πˆ
(
c+2mvL−δ(1−λ)f
(2−α)vL
)
=
αλn[(1+δ(1−λ2 ))(c+2mvL)−δ(1−λ)f ]
2(2−α) .
By comparing Π¯
(
m+ cvL
)
and Πˆ
(
c+2mvL−δ(1−λ)f
(2−α)vL
)
in terms of c, we obtain that Π¯
(
m+ cvL
)
>
Πˆ
(
c+2mvL−δ(1−λ)f
(2−α)vL
)
if and only if
c >
(√
λ+ δ
)
C√
n
+
αλ[2(1+δ(1−λ2 ))mvL−δ(1−λ)f]
2(2−α) − (m+ S −M)[(1 + δ)λvL + δ(1− λ)vH ]
λ
(
1− α(1+δ(1−
λ
2 ))
2(2−α)
)
+ δ
(
λ vLvH + 1− λ
) ≡ c1,
where c1 decreases in n.
In Region (ii), the equilibrium expected total discounted profits of the UCC and the platform are
Π¯(m + c−hvH ) and Πˆ
(
c+2mvL−h
(2−α)vL
)
respectively. Substituting p¯∗1 and p¯
∗
2 into Equation (2), pˆ
∗
1 and pˆ
∗
2 into
Equation (4), we can obtain that Π¯
(
m+ c−hvH
)
= (m + S −M)((1 + δ)λnvL + (1 − λ)nvH) + δλnc +
(c − h)n
(
λ vLvH + 1− λ
)
−
(√
n+ δ
√
λn
)
C, and Πˆ
(
c+2mvL−h
(2−α)vL
)
= αλn[(1+δ)(c+2mvL)−h]2(2−α) . By comparing
Π¯
(
m+ c−hvH
)
and Πˆ
(
c+2mvL−h
(2−α)vL
)
in terms of c and δ, we that Π¯
(
m+ c−hvH
)
> Πˆ
(
c+2mvL−h
(2−α)vL
)
if and
only if
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c >
(
1 + δ
√
λ
)
C√
n
+ h
(
λ vLvH + 1− λ
)
+ αλ[(1+δ)2mvL−h]2(2−α) − (m+ S −M)[(1 + δ)λvL + (1− λ)vH ]
δλ+ (λ vLvH + 1− λ)−
αλ(1+δ)
2(2−α)
≡ c2
and δ >
λα
2(2−α)−
(
λ
vL
vH
+1−λ
)
λ(1− α2(2−α) )
≡ δ1; or c < c2 and δ < δ1.
In Region (iii), the equilibrium expected total discounted profits of the UCC and the platform are
Π¯(m+ c−hvL ) and Πˆ
(
c+2mvL−h
(2−α)vL
)
respectively. Substituting p¯∗1 and p¯
∗
2 into Equation (2), we can obtain that
Π¯
(
m+ c−hvL
)
= (1+ δ)(m+S−M)λnvL+λn((1+ δ)c−h)− (1+ δ)
√
λnC. By comparing Π¯
(
m+ c−hvL
)
and Πˆ
(
c+2mvL−h
(2−α)vL
)
, we obtain the following results.
1. Π¯
(
m+ c−hvL
)
> Πˆ
(
c+2mvL−h
(2−α)vL
)
if and only if c >
(1+δ)
√
λC√
n
+
αλ[2(1+δ)mvL−h]
2(2−α) +λh−(m+S−M)(1+δ)λvL
(1+δ)λ(1− α2(2−α) )
≡ c3,
where c3 decreases in n.
2. Π¯
(
m+ c−hvL
)
> Πˆ
(
c+2mvL−h
(2−α)vL
)
if and only if h <
(1+δ)(m+S−M)λvL+(1+δ)λc−(1+δ)
√
λC√
n
−αλ(1+δ)(c+2mvL)
2(2−α)
λ(1− α2(2−α) )
≡
h1, where h1 increases in n.
Proof of Theorem 4. In Region (i), according to Theorems 1 and 2, we can obtain that n1 = λn, n2 = n,
np,1 =
λn
2 , and np,2 =
λn
2 . Thus, we have ∆¯ψ = (λn−
√
λn+n−√n)ψ and ∆ˆψ = 54λnψ. By comparing
∆¯ψ and ∆ˆψ in terms of n, we obtain that ∆¯ψ > ∆ˆψ if and only if n >
(
1+
√
λ
1−λ/4
)2
. Similarly, the results
for Regions (ii) and (iii) can be determined.
Proof of Theorem 5. Define m7 =
(2−α)[(M−S)λnvL−λnc+
√
λnC]+αλnc2
2(1−α)λnvL ,
m8 =
(M−S)(λnvL+(1−λ)nvH)−
(
λ
vL
vH
+1−λ
)
nc+
√
nC+ αλnc
2(2−α)
2(1−α)λnvL
2−α +(1−λ)nvL
, andm9 =
(M−S)(1−λ)nvH+
[
λ
(
1− vLvH
)
−(1−λ)
]
nc+(
√
n−√λn)C
(1−λ)nvH .
One can see that max{m8,m9} decreases with S. Define θ = min
{
n˜p
n˜s
, 1
}
, where n˜p and n˜s are the ratio-
nal beliefs about the number of carriers who purchase capacity from the platform and who sell capacity
on the platform, respectively.
Similar to the proofs of Lemma 1, we can derive the optimal decision of each carrier i as follows.
1. Each carrier i with vi = vH uses the UCC’s service if p¯ ≤ m+ cvH , or delivers on his own if p¯ > m+ cvH .
2. Each carrier i with vi = vL uses the UCC’s service if p¯ ≤ m + cvL − θ[(1 − α)pˆ − m] and pˆ ≥ p¯,
or purchases capacity from the platform if p¯ > pˆ and pˆ < c+(1+θ)mvL[1+θ(1−α)]vL , or delivers on his own if p¯ >
m + cvL − θ[(1 − α)pˆ −m] and pˆ >
c+(1+θ)mvL
[1+θ(1−α)]vL . Note that carrier i is indifferent between purchasing
capacity from the platform and delivering on his own if pˆ = c+(1+θ)mvL[1+θ(1−α)]vL .
According to the assumption (1−α)pˆ−m < ( 1vL − 1vH )c, we can obtain that m+ cvL −θ[(1−α)pˆ−m] >
m + cvH . Similar to the proof of Lemma 1, we can obtain that the optimal choice of the consolidator is
among the following:
1. Choose p¯∗ > c+2mvL(2−α)vL and pˆ
∗ = c+2mvL(2−α)vL . Under these prices, each carrier i with vi = vH delivers
on his own, and each carrier i with vi = vL is indifferent between delivering on his own (and selling his
remaining capacity to the platform) and purchasing capacity on the platform. The consolidator’s profit
is αλn(c+2mvL)2(2−α) .
2. Choose p¯∗ = m + cvL and pˆ
∗ ≥ m + cvL . Under these prices, each carrier i with vi = vH
delivers on his own, and each carrier i with vi = vL uses the UCC’s service. The consolidator’s profit is
(m+ S −M)λnvL + λnc−
√
λnC.
3. Choose p¯∗ = m+ cvH and pˆ
∗ ≥ m+ cvL . Under these prices, each carrier i uses the UCC’s service.
The consolidator’s profit is (m+ S −M)(λnvL + (1− λ)nvH) + (λ vLvH + 1− λ)nc−
√
nC.
It is optimal for the consolidator to choose the choice that leads to a largest profit. Comparing the
consolidator’s profit under the above three choices, we can obtain the results in Theorem 5.
Proof of Theorem 6. Define m10 = M − S + (
√
n−√λn)C+λnc−
(
λ
vL
vH
+1−λ
)
(c−h)n
(1−λ)nvH ,
m11 = M − S +
(√
λ(1−λ)+λn−λ√n
)
C+λ2nf−λ(1−λ)
(
1+
vH
vL
)
nc
λ(1−λ)n(vL+vH) , and
m12 = M −S+
(√
λ(2−λ)n−√λn
)
C+
(
λ
vL
vH
+1−λ
)
(c+f)λn−
(
1+(1−λ) vHvL
)
λnc
λ(1−λ)nvL . The proof is similar to the proof
of Theorem 1 and thus omitted.
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